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Technologies behind the World Wide Web were created initially to ease sharing
of static data in form of web pages. Popularity of the Web grew rapidly and led
to adoption of web browser as a universal client for application delivery. Though
initially inferior to desktop applications, these applications have caught up with
their desktop counterparts in features and usability.
These applications, called web applications, use multiple web technologies such
as JavaScript and CSS and this multiplicity of web technologies combined with
multiplicity of web browsers creates a unique brew of issues not found on the
desktop. One of these issues is how data send and used by the applications’ users
is protected.
In this thesis, security in one mature web application is described and assessed.
Such an assessment requires knowledge of information security aspects both in
the broader sense concerning all information systems and in the sense of aspects
specific to web applications.
Therefore, first introduced are the fundamental concepts of information security,
building blocks for all the other sections. The fundamentals are followed by discus-
sion of access control and security aspects in applications. The background part
is concluded by discussion of web applications in general and of security questions
specific to them.
The latter part explores and applies these theories and methods in a case study of a
mature web application. The case study first describes, then evaluates the subject
and its security and concludes with discussion of some of the found vulnerabilities
and solutions to them.
Although there were some problems in application of security assessment methods,
assessment results provided valuable information on the application’s weaknesses
and improvement proposals. Implementation of the proposals both improved cur-
rent security and also gave assurance of fewer weaknesses in the future.
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World Wide Webin taustalla olevat tekniikat kehitettiin alun perin helpotta-
maan tiedon jakamista. Ta¨ma¨ jaettu tieto oli aluksi muuttumatonta tai har-
voin muuttuvaa, mutta webin yleistyminen muutti tilanteen. Yleistyminen teki
web-selaimesta nopeasti yleismaailmallisen ohjelmiston sovellusten tuottamiselle
ja ka¨ytta¨ja¨lle va¨litta¨miselle. Vaikka na¨ma¨ web-sovelluksiksi kutsuttavat ohjelmis-
tot olivat alkujaan tyo¨po¨yta¨sovelluksia monin tavoin huonompia, muuttui tilanne
nopeasti.
Web-sovelluksissa ka¨ytetta¨va¨t tekniikat, kuten JavaScript ja CSS, seka¨ web-
selainten moninaisuus muodostavat yhdessa¨ erina¨isten kysymysten sekamelskan,
jota vastaavaa ei tyo¨po¨yta¨sovelluksissa ole. Era¨s ta¨rkea¨ kysymys on, miten sovel-
lusten ka¨ytta¨jien la¨hetta¨ma¨ ja ka¨ytta¨ma¨ tieto turvataan.
Ta¨ssa¨ diplomityo¨ssa¨ tutkitaan ja kuvataan era¨a¨n web-sovelluksen tietoturvallisu-
utta ja tietoturvaratkaisuja. Arvioiminen vaatii tieta¨mysta¨ seka¨ yleisista¨ tietotur-
vallisuuskysymyksista¨ etta¨ erityisesti web-sovelluksiin liittyvista¨ kysymyksista¨.
Ensimma¨isena¨ tutustutaan tietoturvallisuuden peruskysymyksiin ja ka¨sitteisiin,
joiden ymma¨rta¨minen on va¨ltta¨ma¨to¨nta¨. Perusteiden ja¨lkeen ka¨sitella¨a¨n
pa¨a¨synhallintaa ja sovellusohjelmistojen tietoturvallisuutta. Ensimma¨inen osa
pa¨a¨ttyy web-sovellusten ja niihin liittyvien tietoturvallisuuskysymysten esittelyyn.
Ja¨lkimma¨inen osa diplomityo¨sta¨ soveltaa ka¨siteltyja¨ teorioita ja menetelmia¨
era¨a¨n web-sovelluksen tapaustutkimuksessa. Tapaustutkimuksessa kuvataan
ja arvioidaan sovelluksen tietoturvallisuutta seka¨ lopuksi esitella¨a¨n lo¨ydettyja¨
haavoittuvuuksia ja ratkaisuja na¨ihin haavoittuvuuksiin.
Vaikka joidenkin ohjelmistojen tietoturvallisuuden arviointimenetelmien
soveltamisessa olikin ongelmia, saatiin tapaustutkimuksen tuloksena ta¨rkea¨a¨
tietoa heikkouksista ohjelmiston tietoturvallisuudessa ja hyvia¨ esityksia¨ na¨iden
heikkouksen poistamiseksi. Esitykset toteuttamalla parannettiin seka¨ nykyista¨
tietoturvallisuutta etta¨ vakuututtiin siita¨, etta¨ heikkouksia esintyy jatkossa
va¨hemma¨n.
Avainsanat: Web, information security, JavaScript, Ajax
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Glossary of terms and abbreviations
User Agent A client application for some network protocol, mainly used
as a technical term for web browser.
WWW World wide web, a set of interlinked documents accessed
through Internet.
URI Uniform resource identifier is a character string used to iden-
tify resources in the Internet.
Resource Something identified by an URI in the Internet, such as a
document or a person.
Site Short form of website, collection of related documents hosted
on a web server.
HTTP HyperText Transfer Protocol is a protocol used to transmit
documents in WWW.
PRNG Pseudorandom number generator is an algorithm for generat-
ing numbers that approximate random numbers’ properties.
Hostname A unique name for a device connected to a network, usually
to Internet.
NTLM NT LAN Manager is a authentication protocol by Microsoft
commonly used in Windows networks.
XML Extensible Markup Language is a specification for creating
markup languages. Used by different applications as a basis
for their data format.
1Part I
Background
1 Introduction
World-wide web, familiarly known as WWW, is an inter-linked system of hypertext
documents that is accessed through Internet. WWW was conceived 1989-1990 by
an Englishman Tim Berners-Lee working at CERN for physicists to share data
and first versions of needed tools were released by Christmas 1990. These tools
included HyperText Markup Language to create the web pages, HyperText Transfer
Protocol to transfer those pages, and web server to serve those pages to web browsers.
What followed was enormous growth of both information available and users in the
Internet.
Although web pages were originally just static pieces of data served by web servers,
it did not take long until web browser was discovered as the universal thin-client.
This led to creation of web applications, distinguished from normal desktop ap-
plications by two facts: they required no installation as they were delivered over
the Internet on-demand and work on many platforms thanks to requiring only a
standards-compliant web browser. At first, web applications did all the work on
the web server and thus had lower responsiveness and usability than their desktop
counterparts. Such downsides were, in any event, temporary as faster computers
and new web technologies brought web applications’ usability and responsiveness to
the level of desktop applications.
Moving applications from desktop to web created new problems, especially on secu-
rity: generally everyone can access websites and web applications, whereas desktop
applications are accessible only by users that otherwise have access to the computer
running the application. Main difference is that while users of desktop applications
can only harm themselves by breaking a desktop application, malignant web appli-
cation users can potentially cause harm to web application provider and to other
users. Thus web application developers need to consider security aspects that are of-
ten unnecessary on desktop applications. Luckily, these security aspects are nothing
new, information security researchers have studied the same questions for decades,
only their manifestations.
1.1 Goal and scope of thesis
The primary goals of this thesis are evaluation and improvement of security of one
specific web application named Efecte. A secondary goal is to create a document
containing introduction to security concepts needed in web application development.
This secondary goal describes the scope of this thesis: we will not review the whole
vast information security research but only the research that is directly useful in
2secure web application development, mainly from computer security.
1.2 Structure of the thesis
The structure of the thesis is following:
In Section 2, basic concepts and problems of information security are introduced.
This includes defining what is a “secure” system and how we can be assured of its
security.
In Section 3, main theme is building secure software. First introduced and reviewed
are different models of access control. Discussed are both the general methods of
access control and different models for it. Next discussed are both problems and
solutions for building secure software followed by methods to find weaknesses and
vulnerabilities in software and its design
In Section 4, core technologies and concepts behind the Web are introduced. Addi-
tionally, architecture and vulnerabilities common in web applications are described
and discussed.
In Section 5, gives a brief introduction to Efecte corporation and to the case-study
subject, a web application named Efecte. Architecture and concepts of Efecte are
described first, followed by description of Efecte’s security. After this groundwork
has been laid down, Efecte’s current security is analyzed. The analysis starts from
high-level view proceeding to review of select parts of Efecte’s source code.
In Section 6 focuses on selected problems found in the security analysis. The prob-
lems are described and evaluated and mitigation efforts taken are discussed.
Finally, in Section 7 conclusions are drawn and some future improvements not men-
tioned earlier are discussed.
32 Information security
Information, meaning messages and saved records, might be the singular reason
why civilization exists: each generation does not need to do the same mistakes as
their elders did because they can learn from them. Yet most information stored
nowadays is something completely different from instructions of how to make a fire:
census data, subscriber records of a magazine, phone calls, photographs and all the
other things dispensable for survival of the civilization. These dispensable pieces of
information are often such that we would not want to share them with everyone nor
would we want that everyone could change and edit them: one would not want that
after one has paid for a magazine subscription, someone changes one’s name and
address to her own and starts to receive magazines one has paid for.
Information security provides means to protect your magazine subscription data
and other important data. Paraphrasing US code, information security means pro-
tecting information and information system from unauthorized access, disclosure,
modification, destruction or disruption in order to provide confidentiality, integrity
and availability. To be able to discuss information security, the basic concepts and
vocabulary must be first clearly defined. This chapter starts with an introduction
to confidentiality, integrity and availability, followed by the rest of the information
security core concepts.
2.1 CIA triad
2.1.1 Confidentiality
Confidentiality means concealment of data, concealment of resources and conceal-
ment of existence of such data and resources. Reasons for keeping information secret
are manifold: laws and regulations may force secrecy, information may have commer-
cial value or a private citizen may just want to keep her data private. Rise of com-
puters in such sensitive fields as military, government, financial-, and health-sector
gave incentive to develop security models that provide confidentiality. Formal work
on information security models (see 3.2) was first motivated by and modeled after
“need to know”-principle common in military and government. “Need to know”-
principle states that having high enough security clearance is not enough to allow a
person to see some secret information — the person has to demonstrate a need for
such information.
Confidentiality requirements also often apply to existence of the data as a statute
ordering patient records to be confidential but leaving the existence of such record
public would very much undermine the statutes spirit. What disease you actually
had when you visited venereal diseases center may not matter that much if your
whole neighborhood knows about your visit as you have some record there. The
information protected need not reside in databases or files: knowledge resources an
organization uses is information that the organization often would like to keep secret
4because it could help other attacks, as is the case with knowing the IT-infrastructure
of an organization, or give competitors clues on what sort of services could be behind
its success.
Confidentiality is provided by a combination of access control mechanisms and trust.
Common access control mechanisms include cryptography (see HTTPS, 4.1.2) and
access controls provided by computer systems, discussed in Section 3.1. All choices
to provide confidentiality, as with other parts of security, make some assumptions
about possible attackers to the system and resources they have on their disposal.
These assumptions and trust on implemented access controls thus underlie the con-
fidentiality of a system.
2.1.2 Integrity
Improper tampering or unauthorized changes reduce the trustworthiness and there-
fore usefulness of information. Integrity refers to this trustworthiness and includes
both integrity of the data and integrity of the origin of the data. Data integrity
is the internal integrity of this data: has the data been modified by unauthorized
entities or has some of the data been lost. Origin integrity refers to trustworthiness
of the data source: how much trust can be placed on data from this source; how
credible and accurate information the source gives. Integrity is quite different from
confidentiality; confidentiality of the data is a Boolean proposition whereas integrity
concerns both data protection in current storage and the origin of the data.
There are two classes of integrity mechanisms: prevention mechanisms that block
unauthorized changes to the data and detection mechanisms that detect untrustwor-
thy changes in the data. Prevention mechanisms can either prevent only changing
of data by unauthorized parties or prevent changing of data in unauthorized ways.
Examples of such are database integrity mechanisms that require that a specific
value cannot be NULL or needs to be unique. Detection mechanisms do not try
to prevent improper and unauthorized changes in the data but instead report that
data integrity has been lost. These mechanisms may analyze the data to see if the
required constraints still hold (a bank account must have a non-negative balance),
to calculate of checksum on the data (such as cryptographic hash values of a signed
executable file) or analyze system logs to see if unauthorized actions were taken.
Proper evaluation of information integrity is difficult as the origin of the data needs
to be included in the considerations.
2.1.3 Availability
Both integrity and confidentiality usually have little of use if the data is not available;
a way to ensure confidentiality and integrity of records would be to drop them to
the bottom of the ocean floor but this would make the data hard to use, that is,
reduce its availability.
Accidents and deliberate attacks both affect availability: an important computer
5serving data can accidentally be shut down or attackers may launch an attack to
deny users access to a specific computer or service. Protecting availability begins
with a model of the expected use that is then used to decide what mechanisms are
put in place to ensure the availability. For a web server this model could include
that maximum amount of normal users and in a case of an attack, the bandwidth
available to attackers. Should the situation change in a way that model is no longer
correct, such as the attacker being able to use company’s internal network, the
mechanisms based on the model can fail and result a loss of availability.
Attacks on availability can be hard to distinguish from innocent but atypical usage.
For example, a public web server may get attention from more popular sites and as
a consequence get much more traffic than normally, having the same effect on the
server as a contrived denial-of-service attack. This can lead to false alarms with
server administrator hastily thinking that the server is under attack even though
there has just been a link to a page on the server on a popular link aggregation
site. Additionally in the public web server case, availability can be the most impor-
tant factor if the revenue of a company is based on advertisements served on each
web page. Server may not even contain any confidential information and integrity
problems do not cut the revenue as fast as availability problems.
2.1.4 Conclusion
Together confidentiality, integrity and availability form the so-called CIA triad and
they have long been held as the core concepts and goals of information security.
Depending on the system, acts that augment one of the goals can affect others.
For example, Wikipedia-styled system where everyone can edit any data in the
system can arguably boost the integrity of this data but makes confidentiality all
but impossible.
CIA triad gives us basic concepts for information security but to be able to build
secure systems and assess their security, more concepts are needed — starting from
definition of what is “secure”.
2.2 Rest of core concepts
2.2.1 Security policies
Security policy defines what is secure for a system. Security policy states what
is and what is not allowed in a system, be it an organization or a computer. To
implement the policy, other means are usually required. These means are security
model and security mechanisms. Security model formalizes and specifies the policy
and security mechanisms enforce the model and policy. Security mechanism can be
anything ranging from a process to an automatic tool that enforces at least part of
the security policy. A security mechanism is said to be either secure if all states the
mechanism allows are secure, precise if the mechanism only allows all secure states
6or broad if the mechanism allows also insecure states.
To illustrate the difference between security policy and mechanism, consider security
policy in a company that forbids reading of other employees emails except by the
manager of the employees in case the employee is on a holiday and an important
email is expected. If Mike, a system administrator in such a company, having
unlimited access to email servers, read Peter’s, who is another employee in the
company, email he would violate the security policy even though there would be no
security mechanism in place to enforce this policy. Then again, if Annette, Peter’s
manager, knew that Peter will receive an important mail about call for bids within
next few weeks and Peter is at the same time is in Tahiti on honeymoon, she could
read Peter’s email for the next few weeks. This would probably be done with the
aforementioned Mike’s help and neither of them would breach the security policy
provided that Mike would not actually read the mail but just help Annette to read
it. But what if Annette knew, or thought she knew that Peter would receive an offer
of employment from a competitor within the next few weeks?
In the example the policy was simple but still had some uncertainty about in what
cases Annette was allowed to read the mail and in which cases she was not. Security
policies are often formulated in a natural language known for its ambiguousness.
Furthermore they are not formulated precisely and exist in a world with other poli-
cies, laws and regulations. It is then no wonder that policies often are not clear cut.
This manifests in cases which are not clearly allowed or forbidden and require inter-
pretation of the security policy instead of straightforward inference. The problem
is even more clear when two or more entities with security policies communicate:
the policies are not usually exactly the same, leading to either breaches of policy or
more difficult communications when party A cannot send data to party C because
C ’s security policy is different and does not protect some part of the data.
2.2.2 Assumptions, trust and assurance
Security policy determines what a system should do and how to do it. Security of
the system rests on assumptions that are specific to what kind of security is required
and to the environment the system is used in. Paraphrasing [Bis02], assume that
opening a door lock requires a key and that the lock is secure against lock picking.
This assumption is based on the fact that most people cannot pick locks. However,
a good lock picker can open the lock without the key. Thus, in a environment
with a skilled but untrustworthy lock picker, security of the system lays on invalid
assumption and cannot be considered secure.
Were the lock picker trustworthy, the assumption would be valid and system could
be secure if also other assumptions were valid. The term trustworthy means that the
lock picker will not pick the lock unless authorized by the owner of the lock. Thus
the lock picker can be trusted. In essence, trusted means the same as something
that can hurt you if untrustworthy.
Trusting the system to be secure requires trusting that security policy correctly
7and clearly partitions system’s states to “secure” and “insecure” and that security
mechanisms prevent the system from entering a “insecure” state, meaning that union
of security mechanisms is a security mechanism that is not broad.
This trust cannot be quantified precisely and instead we have to estimate how much
we trust the system. We can implement specific actions that assure us of the sys-
tem’s trustworthiness, such as arguments or proofs that the system’s design and
implementation satisfy system’s specification or tests and evaluations of the system
that did not find any undesired behavior (See section 3.3). Assurance is then our
estimate, that is, subjective probability that the system in question will not fail in
some specific way.
Quote from Lampson et al. [LABW92] summarizes assumptions and trust:
In any security system there are assumptions about authority and trust.
The theory tells you how to state them precisely and what the rules are
for working out their consequences. Once YOU have done this, You can
look at the assumptions, rules, and consequences and decide whether
you like them. If so, you have a clear record of how you got to where
you are. If not, you can figure out what went wrong and change it.
2.2.3 Threats and attacks
A potential violation of security is called a threat ; security violations do not need
a realization to be called as threats. Actions that can cause realization of threats
through vulnerabilities are called attacks and executers of such actions called attack-
ers.
Vulnerability is a weakness in the security system that can be exploited to cause
harm.
Threat is a potential violation of security policy, usually to steal or damage assets.
Attack is an action that can realize a threat.
Control mechanism is a protective measure such as action, device, procedure or
technique that reduces or completely removes a vulnerability. Often called
just “controls”.
Pfleeger and Pfleeger summarize this neatly: “A threat is blocked by control of a
vulnerability” [PP06].
As an important part of information security is creating and using different con-
trols, types of threats that they control need to be well understood. Combining
categorizations by Gollman [Gol05] and Bishop [Bis02] we get five different classes
of threats.
8• Snooping or wiretapping causes information disclosure. Snooping is a passive
attack where attacker listens to communications that are not intended for her
or browses through files or other information that is available but are not
meant for the attacker. Confidentiality services, such as encryption or more
broadly, access control, is used to counter this attack.
• In identity spoofing the attacker pretends to be another person or computer.
Spoofing is also known as masquerading. Such an attack can happen, for ex-
ample, when a user tries to access a computer across the Internet but another
computer masquerades as the target computer. The user using this computer
can then receive wrong and deceptive information and if the user authenti-
cates, attacker may get the credentials of the user. This threat is countered
by integrity mechanisms, namely by authentication of both the user and the
system.
• Tampering with data, that is, unauthorized alteration of the data, is an active
attack. Tampering attacks can lead to various results such as denial of service
or information disclosure. Denial of service can happen when a system uses
tampered data to determine what action to take, for example a web service
could be shut down by giving it specific parameter that is not available through
its web page based interface. Man-in-the-middle attack in an example of
information disclosure: when two entities communicate with each other, a
third party spoofs to both parties as the other party and can read and tamper
their messages as long as they have not agreed on encryption key beforehand
or do not use a trusted third party for identification. Integrity services can
be used to counter these attacks; Man-in-the-middle attack, for example, is
thwarted by public key infrastructure.
• Repudiation attack is a false denial of having done something such as having
sent or received a message. Repudiation is an important concern in web com-
merce where a customer may deny that she has ordered anything and therefore
stop her credit card company from charging her for her purchase. Integrity
mechanisms are used to combat repudiation: having the buyer enter informa-
tion that only she should know such as her credit card number and precise
address gives the seller and credit card company assurance that card owner is
the actual orderer.
• Delay is an attack that makes a service, such as a website, partially or com-
pletely unavailable (Denial of service). Delay attacks require some way to
control either the service structure or the medium used to contact this service
(e.g. a network). Delay attacks can enable other attacks such as spoofing: if
the attacker cannot spoof as the main server of some service but can spoof as
some backup-server, the attacker can drive users to the spoofed server by in-
ducing delays to the main server. Availability mechanisms, such as blacklisting
offensive users, counter this threat.
92.2.4 Risks and risk analysis
A moment of contemplation on the threat classes described in Section 2.2.3 allows
anyone to come up with multiple threats against any system they know if they just
let their imagination run free to come up various kinds of ideas. The question is:
how many of these ideas then are “crazy”?
It is usually easy to come up with so many threats against the system that they
all cannot be protected against. Realization of some threats is more serious than of
other threats (cause more damage measured in some suitable unit such as money)
and some threats are more probable or easier to realize. When choosing what control
mechanisms to implement, a rational decision-maker should take these both facts
into account and then choose the action that mitigates the risk the best according
to a cost-benefit analysis.
Different sources have a bit different uses for risk analysis vocabulary. Following
usage of Richard E. Fairley [Fai05], we define terms for risk analysis as follows:
Risk is the probability of realization of a threat.
Risk impact is the loss caused by a realized threat.
Risk exposure is the expected value of a threat: risk of the threat multiplied by
risk impact of the same threat.
Risk mitigation is a course of action that can reduce the probability, loss or both
associated with a certain threat.
Risk mitigating actions are divided into four main categories: actions that avoid the
risk, actions that reduce the risk, actions that transfer the risk and finally, actions
that assume the risk. Cost-benefit analysis on choosing what risks to mitigate and
how is based on comparing risk leverages. Risk leverage is
(risk exposure before mitigation)− (risk exposure after mitigation)
(cost of risk mitigation)
Now, we have all the concepts needed for a basic risk analysis. The outline of a risk
analysis is listed below.
1. Identify the assets. Before we can do anything at all, we first need to decide
what to protect. This is usually done when security policy is formulated.
2. Determine vulnerabilities. Here we start with the CIA triad and want to con-
sider situations that could cause loss of confidentiality, integrity or availability.
There is not simple process or checklist to find all vulnerabilities and many
organizations have come up with their own processes such as VAM methodol-
ogy by RAND Corporation [AAMS03] and RMF by Cigital [McG06]. We will
return on this question in Section 3.4.
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3. Estimate the likelihood of exploitation. This requires considering stringency of
current controls and estimating likelihood for evading the controls. Estimating
likelihood can be the hardest step in the analysis.
4. Compute expected loss. Determining value of physical object can seem quite
straightforward as we only have to compute replacement costs of the object:
cost of a new object and cost of work to replace it.
5. Survey the control mechanisms and their costs. Controls have both positive
and negative effects: saving document after each revision improves integrity
of the system but consumes more resources and may make the system harder
to use. Controls do not need to be chosen through a rigorous process when
there are only a few available. Otherwise it is wiser to use a more systematic
approach such as the aforementioned VAM.
6. Compute risk leverages and decide the best course of action. After calculating
risk leverages for each control and for doing nothing, we can do a cost-benefit
analysis and choose the best course of action to mitigate risk.
Although the risk analysis method described here is intended for information secu-
rity, it is generally not restricted to information security only.
2.2.5 Conclusion
Security policy defines when a system is considered secure. Security of every sys-
tem is based on some set of assumptions that, if unfounded, can make the system
insecure. To be able to trust a system to be secure, we need to have some level of
assurance for its security. This assurance comes in form of proofs and arguments
that support the fact that the system is working as intended by security policy.
Arguments and 
proofs
Tests and 
evaluations
Assuranceproduce
Give evidence 
of
Owners
require
Controls Risk Assetstominimize
that
Figure 1: Concepts affected and affecting Assurance. Adapted from [ISO]
.
Uncontrolled vulnerabilities give rise to threats and attacks. Risk is a measure of
how likely a threat is realized. These relations are described in Figure 2.
11
Owners
Controls
Vulnerabilities
Risk
Assets
Threats
Attackers
Give rise to
Impose
May be aware of
to
That exploit
To reduce
Wish to minimize
value
May possess
May be 
reduced by
Wish to damage or abuse
increase
to
Figure 2: Relations of some of the concepts introduced in this section. Adapted
from [ISO]
.
2.3 Human factor
Implementing a policy becomes the harder the larger the organization the policy
is imposed on. Incorrectly implementing a security policy may render it useless or
even harmful to the organization. Most important problem in security policies is
that they cannot create anything that boosts a company’s bottom line; the policies
can only prevent losses. Therefore policies will not gather respect unless they can be
shown to have prevented some specific loss or there have been losses before because
of the bad security practices. The immediate effect may even be negative as the
policies often hinder user productivity.
An additional problem may be that those who are responsible for security policy
implementation may not have enough power or resources to actually implement
them. As always, responsibility without power and vice versa leads to problems, as
those who are responsible and see the security problems need to petition managers
and other people to have the policies actually implemented.
In the case of sufficient power, resources may still be lacking. For example, con-
sider a case where the policies are implemented using computers and the person
responsible for this is the system administrator. Although she already has access
to company’s computers and therefore power to establish the policy, she has dozens
of other responsibilities, many of which are more visible such as helping other em-
ployees with their computer problems and updating company website. This can
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lead to sloppy implementation as the security responsibility is seen as secondary
to the other responsibilities. All above have assumed that there is already a sane
security policy that only needs implementation but if the security policy needs to be
designed based on vague requirements, designing and implementing security policy
needs money and time, both unfortunately scarce resources.
The weakest link in many security systems are the people using it. This is especially
true in computer security systems as many controls can be surpassed by human
intervention. Lack of training and honest mistakes can both significantly weaken
security systems. Lack of training can cause security policies, such as verification
of backups, not to be followed. Honest mistakes are the worse the more power
over security policies is wielded by the mistaken person: incorrectly implemented
password policy may cause the entire organization to have weak passwords and
therefore to be an easier target for attacks.
Attacks can come both from in- and outside the organization. Earlier, insiders
were responsible of 73 to 90 percent of computer security crimes [Uni99], but this
has changed. With the rise of the Internet and network services, insider’s share of
attacks has decreased significantly and now most of the attacks come from outside,
while 44% of attacks are performed by insiders [Ric].
Insiders have the advantage of knowing the access controls and people better so
circumventing the first and persuading the latter is easier. Knowing both official
organization and unofficial organization, insiders have a better chance of avoiding
detection and launching a successful social engineering attack. Social engineering
is a technique where attacker induces someone to give up secrets, such as their
password by bribing, lying or purporting to be someone else such as a senior officer
of a company. One last thing making insider attacks more dangerous is that many
organizations have hard walls of security against the outside but inside these walls
there is little security.
Outsiders do not have the informational advantage the insiders have but they can
partly make this up with their other advantages. Determined attackers from the
outside are usually much more skillful technically for attacking is their area of ex-
pertise and attacking through the Internet, they can more easily cover their tracks
in case the attack is detected.
2.4 Conclusion
Contrary to what recent scares of terrorism, computer viruses and killer flus would
make us believe, security is always a trade-off. All security is based on some as-
sumptions that may prove to be wrong and these assumptions hold the key to
understanding a system’s security. Only if assumptions are correct and trust is well
placed, can a system be secure. The concepts introduced here make up the vocab-
ulary needed to discuss and determine these assumptions and control mechanisms
that enable creation of trusted systems.
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3 Computer security
Whereas Section 2 was an introduction to general concepts of information security,
this section will focus more on concepts and methods needed for building secure com-
puter systems such as web applications. Computer security being a large field, only
subjects connected to secure applications, especially web applications, are discussed.
This section first introduces different access control models, models to control who
is allowed to do what with data. This is followed by a quick review on fundamentals
of building secure software. Lastly, we discuss methods to assess vulnerability of
software to different attacks.
3.1 Access control
Ability to allow or deny access to different resources based on the accessing entity is
called access control. Access control consists of authentication (“Who is accessing
the system?”), authorization (“Can she do this?”) and possibly of auditing (“Check
what she has done”). Security policies and therefore security models that model
those policies can use two kinds of access control, either alone or in combination.
First one is discretionary access control (DAC) where the owner of the data decides
who can access the data. In the other one, mandatory access control (MAC), some
higher authority controls the access and owner of the data cannot override it.
We will first define access control in the general sense and describe a general model
that forms the basis for other models. Later, different mandatory access control
models are introduced, starting from Ball-La Padula confidentiality model, ending
to role-based access control and discussion of special access controls.
3.1.1 Basic access control model
Most computer systems that implement access control, use variant of access control
matrix model first proposed by Butler Lampson [Lam71]. Elements of this model
are shown in Figure3.
In the model, authentication deals with obtaining the source of request which maps
to a principal. Noting ambiguousness of term principal [Gol01], we define principal
here as “an entity that can be granted access to objects or can make statements
affecting access control decisions” ([GGKL89]). These statements a principal makes
are primitive access operations such as “open file foo” or “execute program bar” and
it is these primitive operations that reference monitor then either allows or denies.
In addition to this authorization, reference monitor may also create an audit trail by
logging all or some access operations made (not included in Lampson’s model but in
modern operating systems based on it). This trail can later be audited to see that
no security violations have taken place or to find culprits. Finally after these checks,
reference monitor allows access to resources principal sought. These resources are
called objects and usually include files, different users, memory addresses and such.
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There is also a specific sub-class of objects called subjects that are active entities
within the system (e.g. a running process). For purposes of reference monitor,
subjects are bound to principals and monitor makes decisions based on access rights
of the principal.
Principal Reference monitor ObjectDo operation
Source Request Guard Resource
Figure 3: The fundamental access control model
3.1.2 Authentication
The first problem faced in access control model is authentication. Authentication
is the process of binding an external entity to a principal. In order to authenticate,
this entity must provide her alleged identity (commonly user name) and then some
additional information that can prove the identity. This additional data comes
from one or more of the sources listed in Table 1, most commonly from a password
(knowledge).
Table 1: Four different ways to authenticate
Knowledge Something the user knows, such as a password
Biometric Something the user is or inherently has, such as fingerprints or an iris image
Item Something the user has, such as a key
Location Where the user is, such as in the front of the terminal
Each of these authentication methods has its own strengths and weaknesses:
Knowledge such as a password is theoretically the most secure as it only ex-
ists within the head of a principal, but the principal can choose weak pass-
words [Kle90, YBAG04] and can be subjected to physical and psychological
coercion.
Biometric identifiers such as iris images or fingerprints are always available and can
be hard to fake or steal. As such biometric identifiers rely on statistical meth-
ods, they are subject to cases where legitimate users are not recognized (false
negative) and to cases where illegitimate users are identified as a legitimate
user (false positive). For a more throughout discussion, see Anderson [And01].
Items such as tamper resistant security tokens are physical keys and share some
problems of other physical items as they too can be lost and stolen.
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Location trades authentication problem for physical security problem: how to keep
people out of a specific location. This trade can be quite beneficial as physical
security is better understood but has the downside that using computer system
only from a specific location can be very cumbersome.
Password-based authentication is the most common authentication method probably
because it is the easiest to implement and it can be quite strong authentication
method given some assumptions, such as users do not write passwords down and
that they use strong password, hold. Most text books on computer security contain
good advice on password systems, see, for example, [PP06, Gol05].
In order for authentication to be considered “strong”, at least two of the factors
listed in Table 1 need to be used. The combination most often used is knowledge,
namely a password, combined with some other source of information such as a
security token.
3.1.3 Authorization
Authorization is, as stated earlier, answering the question “is subject allowed to
do this?”. As subjects are mapped to principals, what needs to be considered in
authorization is only tuple (s, o, a), with
s ∈ S, where s is a specific subject and S is set of all subjects in a system,
o ∈ O, where o is a specific object and O is set of all objects in a system, and
a ∈ A, where a is a specific access operation and A is set of all access operations
in a system.
Here the access operations vary from system to system but commonly include at least
reading the object (commonly abbreviated as “r”), writing to it (“w”), executing
the object as a program (“x”) and changing access rights of the object (“c”).
For each pair {s, o}, entry of an access control matrix Ms,o (see Table 2(a)) contains
set A˜ denoting the subject’s allowed access operations to the object, called access
rights. If a ∈ A˜, then a is allowed, otherwise it is denied. If owners of different
objects are allowed to change access rights of different subjects, we get discretionary
access control, otherwise mandatory access control. The policy behind authorization
is the key difference between different access control models and will be discussed
further in Section 3.2.
As present computer systems contain millions of files and multi-user system can have
thousand of different users, storing and accessing all these rights in a access control
matrix (as per Table 2(a)) would be wasteful and in large systems, perhaps impos-
sible. Instead, access rights can be stored per subject in capabilities (Table 2(c)) or
per object in access control lists (ACLs, Table 2(b)) so empty access rights need not
to be stored at all.
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Table 2: Different modes of access control. r = read, w = write, x = execute
(a) Access control matrix
Subject shared.txt program.exe diary.txt
Alice {r, w} {r, x} ∅
Bob {r} ∅ {w}
(b) Access Control Lists
Object Subjects and access rights
shared.txt Alice: {r,w}; Bob: {r}
program.exe Alice: {r,x}
diary.txt: Bob: {w}
(c) Capabilities
Alice shared.txt: {r, w}; program.exe: {r, x}
Bob shared.txt: {r}; diary.txt: {w}
Difference between capability- and ACL-based systems is not limited to storage
mode. In addition, capabilities and ACLs differ in how access rights are granted
and propagated. As seen in Table 3, ACL-based system are object-centric whereas
capability-based systems are subject-centric.
One of the key features in capability-based system is ability to give other subjects
just the access rights that are needed and nothing more. This is known as the
principle of least privilege (see Section 3.3.3). Using capabilities could prevent a
common source of security problems called confused deputy [Har88] where a subject,
usually a computer program, is fooled by some other party to use its own access
rights instead of the other party’s rights. For example, a web service is supposed
to display only files readable by its user but instead uses its own access rights to
determine what is readable, allowing users to read files they are not supposed to
access.
Despite its benefits, systems are not often based on capabilities but on ACLs: all con-
temporary mainstream operating systems use ACLs whereas capabilities are limited
to research operating systems such as KeyKOS and to implementation at application
level.
3.1.4 Accountability and Audit
Logging every access, successful or not, to audit log seems appealing as it allows
evaluation of all actions that could affect system’s security. As good as it sounds,
total logging has two big problems: such a log would usually be enormous and
reduce system’s performance and finding useful information in such data would be
like searching a needle in a haystack.
On author’s single-user desktop system, opening Microsoft Word caused over 1100
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Table 3: Similarities and differences in ACL- and capability-based systems.
ACL Capabilities
All subjects accessing an object
need to authenticated.
System only checks for valid ca-
pability, it does not need to au-
thenticate subjects.
System maintains ACL for each
object.
Forging capabilities must be hard
or impossible.
System mediates all changes to
ACLs to protected their integrity.
Owner of an object can give ac-
cess rights to other subject with-
out system’s help.
Only subjects allowed to change
object’s ACL can grant access
rights.
A capability can be passed to oth-
ers in part or in full (delegation).
Access rights to a certain object
can be revoked centrally.
Each subject can only revoke its
own capabilities - access to a spe-
cific object may not be centrally
revocable.
It is easy to see who have access
to a specific object but arduous to
see what objects a specific subject
can access as it requires enumer-
ation of all objects in the system.
It is easy to see what a specific
subject can access and instead it
is laborious to see access rights to
a specific object.
accesses to file system and registry and during one minute of just writing this docu-
ment and listening to music, over 40,000 such accesses were recorded. Logging such
data for 24 hours would create a log with over 55 million entries so it is not hard to
imagine how loaded larger systems with more users and activity would be because of
such logging. Usually the amount legitimate of access overshadows that of attacks
making detection of such attacks hard - especially as system administrators cannot
go through the logs manually but have to create some programs to analyze the logs
and detect intrusions and intrusion attempts.
It is clear that less amount of logging is needed but how much? If two employees
write to the same order file and order is later discovered illegitimate, holding both
accountable for the order may be wrong but if logging is only done on level of writing
and closing files, nothing more can be done. Still, in many other cases, logging every
character written to a file is too detailed and leads to enormous amount of logging.
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3.2 Security models
3.2.1 Bell-La Padula model
Bell-La Padula1 model [BL73], BLP for short, is a seminal model of confidentiality
and has influenced many other security models. BLP takes mandatory access control
of security levels and categories, combining it with discretionary access control of
“need to know”-principle.
In BLP, each subject has security clearance C(s) = ls and each object a security
classification C(o) = lo. Additionally, each object has a set of categories it belongs
to and each subject has a set of categories it has access to. These categories can, for
example, denote in what projects the subject works. In such scenario, object with
multiple categories would mean that the object is used in multiple projects.
These two different mandatory access controls, set of classifications C and set of
categories K form a set of compartments or security levels L, L = C ×K. Define
the relation dom (dominates) as follows.
Domination: Security Level (C1, K1) dominates (dom) security level (C2, K2) if
and only if C2 ≤ C1 and K2 ⊆ K1.
Now set of security levels L together with relation dom form a lattice.
Last thing needed to state BLP model is access matrix M . M = (Mso)s∈S,o∈O
gives access permission that given subject s has on the given object o, based on
subject current “need to know”. Security Levels together with access matrix allow
the definition of BLP security policies.
Simple Security Condition: Subject s can read object o if and only if s dom o
and Mso contains read access.
Simple security condition simply states that subject needs to have both access
through mandatory access control and through discretionary access control. It is
usually stated as “no reads up”.
∗-Property: Subject s can write to object o if and only if o dom s and Mso contains
write access.
∗-property prevents information leakage to lower security levels as information can
only be written to current security level or to levels that dominate the current
level. This property is informally stated as “no writes down.” Without additional
mechanisms, ∗-property would prevent every subject s from communicating with
subjects S˜ for which L(s) dom L(S˜).
To allow this sort of communication from s to s˜ s can decrease its effective security
level from (Cs, Ks) to (Csˆ, Ksˆ) such that (Cs, Ks) dom (Csˆ, Ksˆ)∧(Cs˜, Ks˜) dom (Csˆ, Ksˆ).
1Leonard La Padula is often misspelled as LaPadula, for example in the cover of [BL73].
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As s temporarily loses some of its access rights, it cannot pass information to sub-
jects with lower clearance. While it is not realistic to expect a human to forget all
information seen from higher levels, the model is intended for computer systems:
a process may lower its security clearance and lose access to some objects, such as
files, in order to edit objects with lower security clearance.
Bell-La Padula model is a simple but effective model, roughly abbreviated as “no
write down, no read up”. It provides confidentiality in environments where confi-
dentiality is most highly valued of the CIA triad, not touching questions of integrity
and availability in any way. Strong confidentiality makes it suited for governments
and military but in many businesses data integrity is more important.
3.2.2 Integrity models
Whereas in military environments, access to information is controlled by both se-
curity clearance and “need to know”, in commercial environments an individual
is usually given the data if she just needs it. This need for information could be
modeled with Bell-La Padula model but would lead to problems: proliferation of se-
curity labels and categories, leading to issues because of the centralization of security
clearances.
Even tight control of data may not always help as publicly traded companies need to
release some data because of laws and they allow their partners access to some data.
Taken together, this data that is innocuous by itself, will often allow deduction of
confidential information. This is accepted and companies can still function correctly
even if some of their secrets get out but not so when companies order lists and
warehouse inventories get corrupted.
Enter integrity models: three most well known integrity models are Biba model [Bib75],
Clark-Wilson model [CW87] and Lipner’s integrity matrix model [Lip82] that is
combination of Bell-La Padula and Biba models. Of these models, we will describe
the first two.
3.2.3 Biba models
Whereas BLP guards confidentiality, Biba models [Bib75] protect integrity. There
is actually a set of Biba models and term “Biba’s model” usually refers to Biba’s
“strict integrity model”.
In all Biba models, integrity and trustworthiness of data is denoted by integrity lev-
els, denoted by I(x), a concept similar but distinct to security levels. Security levels
of objects denote their classification but object integrity levels (I(o)) depict how
much trust there is on the information; the higher the integrity, the more confidence
we have that a program will execute correctly and data is accurate and reliable.
Subject integrity level (I(s)) describes how much we trust information generated
by the subject: how trustworthy are her sources and how good the information she
generates is.
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Biba’s Model (String integrity Policy)
Biba’s model can be summed to three rules, as follows.
1. s ∈ S can read o ∈ O if and only if I(s) ≤ I(o)
2. s ∈ S can write to o ∈ O if and only if I(o) ≤ I(s)
3. s1 ∈ S can execute s2 ∈ S if and only if I(s2) ≤ I(s1)
This is the Biba’s model ; it is the mathematical dual of BLP model. The model,
shown in Figure 4(a) can be summed as “no read down, no write up”. Biba’s model
does not allow change in subjects’ or objects’ integrity levels, making the model
hard to use in practice. For practical usage, there are Biba models allowing such
changes.
Low watermark policies
Low watermark policies allow change of integrity levels and either modification of
objects at any integrity level or reading of objects at any integrity level.
Subject low watermark policy removes the first clause of strict integrity policy
and allows subject to read any object o at any integrity level. Integrity level
of the reading subject s is lowered to the lesser of I(s) and I(o).
This policy assumes that subject will rely on the data she has read from lower
integrity level and therefore can no more be trusted to write on her earlier integrity
level. Therefore her integrity level is lowered. It is shown in Figure 4(c).
Object low watermark policy states that subject s can alter an object o at any
integrity level. New integrity level of o is the lesser of I(s) and I(o).
Object low watermark policy drives does not prevent improper modification, only
makes the modification apparent by lowering the integrity level of modified infor-
mation.
Both policies allow only non-increasing changes in integrity levels. This can even-
tually lead to situation where either all objects are at the smallest integrity level or
to all subjects have clearance only to smallest integrity level.
Ring property
Writing to higher integrity levels can be allowed through gates : trusted procedures
that perform consistency checks ensuring that objects in higher integrity levels do
not get contaminated.
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Subject s1 can read objects at any integrity levels.
Subject s1 can execute s2 ∈ S if and only if I(s1) ≤ I(s2).
This is named as ring property in [Gol05] but the name is easy to mix up with
ring policy introduced in [Bib75] that does the reverse, allowing execution only
if I(s2) ≤ I(s1). Ring property-solutions are employed in many computer systems
where a user can change some data through a trusted interface, marked with execute
in Figure 4(b). For example, in Unixes user cannot directly modify password file
to change her password, but can change the password in the file through passwd
program that is run with supervisor rights.
This usage of trusted procedures is developed further in Clark-Wilson model.
3.2.4 Clark-Wilson Model
Clark and Wilson argue [CW87] that both Bell-La Padula and Biba models are
better suited for protecting confidentiality instead of integrity and therefore good
for systems where confidentiality is the most important aspect, such as military
systems. To protect the integrity of the data, the most important requirement in
commercial systems, Clark and Wilson proposed a radically different model called
Clark-Wilson model.
In Clark-Wilson model, data can only be manipulated through a specific set of
programs; users have access only to these programs, never directly to data. This
bring us to first difference between Clark-Wilson and Biba or BLP models: in Biba
and BLP models, authorization allows subject to perform some generic action a, such
as reading or writing whereas in Clark-Wilson model authorization gives permission
to run a well-formed transaction through a specific procedure.
Clark-Wilson model divides data to two sets: to constrained data items (CDIs),
which are governed by security model and to unconstrained data items (UDIs) that
are inputs to the system from outside. Conversion from UDI to CDI is a critical
part of the system and is managed by transformation procedures (TPs) that must
be certified to be valid. In addition, integrity verification procedures (IVPs) ensure
that the system is in a valid state each time the IVPs are run.
System security properties are defined through five certification rules and enforced
by four enforcement rules.
Certification rule 1: IVPs must ensure that all CDIs are in a valid state when
any IVP is run.
Certification rule 2: TPs must be certified to be valid, that is they must trans-
form CDIs in a valid state to another valid state.
Each TP is certified only for some set of CDIs: a certified TP working with strings
can corrupt the system when fed with pictures. This leads to first enforcement rule:
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(c) Subject low watermark policy. In low watermark policies integrity levels change based on used
information. Here integrity level of the subject is lowered to the integrity level of the information
used.
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Enforcement rule 1: The system must maintain and protect list of CDIs that
TPs are certified to access and manipulate.
Enforcement rule 2: The system must maintain and protect a list of tuples (user,
TP, {CDIs}) that each user is allowed to execute.
This provides the basis of Clark-Wilson access control. Users can only deal with
specific CDIs, using specific TPs.
Certification rule 3: The access rules must satisfy any separation of duty require-
ments.
Access rules must satisfy any separation of duty requirements that may be in place:
if company has a policy that it requires two people to make an order greater than
10,000 $, access rules in Clark-Wilson model must also require it.
Enforcement rule 3: Each user must be authenticated on each TP execution at-
tempt.
There is no need to authenticate users that log in the system from Clark-Wilson
model’s viewpoint as only UDIs can be manipulated without invoking a TP. Invoking
a TP then requires authentication each time and the invocation is logged, giving
certification rule 4:
Certification rule 4: Every invocation of TP must append enough information to
reconstruct the operation to an append-only CDI.
Certification rule 5: Each TP that takes as input a UDI must transform it to a
valid CDI or reject it and perform no transformation at all.
This means that all transformations from UDI to CDI are transactions: either trans-
formation succeeds totally or system is restored to a state where no transformation
was done at all, except for the log specified in certification rule 4.
Enforcement rule 4: Only a certifier of a TP may change the list of entities as-
sociated with the TP. Such certifier must never have “execute” permission on
that TP.
The last enforcement rule presents separation of duties: same person who certifies
a TP cannot be its user making this integrity enforcement mandatory instead of
discretionary.
Compared to Bell-La Padula and Biba’s model, Clark-Wilson model is more com-
plex. It is clearly designed for commercial organizations with its emphasis on sep-
aration of duty and its control of integrity through verified TPs, both integral in
prevention of insider fraud.
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3.2.5 Role-based access control model
Role-based access control is a suitable model when access to data depends on user’s
role, such as job function. Sandha et al. describe a family of role-based access
control models [SCFY96] of which here is described a model named RBAC1.
Each user may have one or more roles, each having its own list of allowed actions
and user as such does not have any other rights than the roles she belongs to. Roles
themselves may contain other roles and thus allow composition of larger roles: a
trainer is allowed to do anything a trainee can do as well as perform other actions.
Thus, role-based access control is very suitable for security requirements of hierar-
chical organizations.
Role-based access control can also model separation of duty required by organiza-
tions and specify it centrally. Given actions a and b that need to be done by separate
persons, restriction can be imposed that if a ∈ allowed(A) and b ∈ allowed(B), then
for no subject s can belong to both roles A and B.
Although Role-based access control is a simple model and helps to reduce the com-
plexity of managing access control, only a few operating systems, such as AS/400
and Windows 2000, support it.
3.2.6 Database privacy models
Some databases, such as census database, contain sensitive data that users are al-
lowed to access in aggregate form such as “return number of males within ages of 40
to 49 living in Kansas”. Yet multiple queries or queries that are sufficiently specific
can be used to retrieve information on specific individuals: “return wealth of men
living in Antarctica with age of 32 and blue eyes” will quite certainly return at most
one result and if more results are returned, the query can be specified further.
To prevent this breach of confidentiality, Dobkin et al. [DJL79] showed that such
systems need to take into account both query history and what can be inferred based
on those older queries and current query when making access decisions. Denied
queries, as well as denied accesses in other mechanisms can then be logged and
actions taken if such queries are seen as intrusion attempts.
There have been other approaches after Dobkin et al. and for good background
information and overview models, see Privacy-Preserving Data Mining [AY08].
3.2.7 Conclusion
Access control in security models comes in two versions: mandatory and discrete
access control. All models described here are mandatory access models suitable
to situations where access needs to be controlled in a top-down fashion. Bell-La
Padula and Biba models are rooted in military-style security whereas Clark-Wilson
and Role-based access control models were developed for business’ requirements.
25
Operating systems rarely support mandatory access control models but applications
used to share information within organizations often need to implement such a
model.
3.3 Creating secure software
Research of secure systems has long been focused on creating secure operating sys-
tems and less so on other systems such as application programs. This is perhaps
because creating a secure operating system is a much more daunting task than just
a secure word processor. Security requirements differ: Operating systems usually
cannot trust that all programs run on it will behave nicely but a word processor can
expect that its user will behave well as the user will be the only one suffering from
malfunctions.
Yet some software, such as software getting input from network (e.g. web server)
faces same dilemmas as operating systems: intentionally misbehaving users trying to
do something that they are not “supposed” to do. And if there are any vulnerabilities
in the software, they may very well be able to do it.
This section discusses problems face in creating secure software, first discussing the
problems, then solutions in form of development models and design principles.
3.3.1 Why developing secure software is hard?
Vulnerabilities in software come in two flavors: both a design flaw and an imple-
mentation flaw (usually called a bug) can create vulnerabilities. An example of
design-level flaw is use of insecure cryptographic algorithm to provide confidential-
ity whereas implementation flaw could be that a secure cryptographic algorithm is
implemented incorrectly allowing attacker to break confidentiality.
Creating working software is thought to be fundamentally hard [Bro87] and there
are no techniques to eliminate or address all program flaws. It is then no wonder
that information security, being implemented on computers, is hard. Gasser notes
this and lists reasons why creating secure software is especially hard [Gas88].
• Security is fundamentally difficult. Creating large software systems is hard and
such systems often are bug-ridden. Despite these bugs, systems are still usable
as few bugs are fatal and others can be circumvented. Instead in supposedly
secure software, each bug has potential to circumvent the controls in place
and leave system open to attackers. As Gasser states, “You might be able to
live in a house with a few holes in the walls, but you will not be able to keep
burglars out.”
• Security is an afterthought. As new customers are rarely won through secu-
rity (barring limited sectors such as banking), but instead with appearance,
usability, performance and number of new features. This often causes security
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to be only an afterthought in software: when vulnerabilities are found, they
are patched over instead of addressing the more fundamental problems causing
vulnerabilities in the software.
• Security is an impediment. Goals of making software secure and making it easy
to use often conflict. This is especially true when security is an afterthought
instead of being built-in from the start.
• False solutions impede progress. False solutions give sense of security without
actually solving the security problems.
• People are the problem, not computers. Gasser wrote the list 21 years ago
and humans haven’t changed much during that time. As stated in Section 2.3,
people are often the weakest link in security allowing penetration of otherwise
impregnable system using social engineering.
Creation of software can be thought to consist of three conceptually separate steps:
specification, design and implementation. How the steps are interconnected depends
on the development methodology and process used. Lest security becomes an af-
terthought, it must be considered in each of these steps. This thinking has lead
many development methodologies to add special emphasis on security and to devel-
opment of new processes, such as “The Security Development Lifecycle” [HL06] by
Microsoft, instilled with security-awareness.
3.3.2 Development models for secure software
A fruitful discussion of different software development models could fill a book.
Instead only two processes that were created for developing secure software are
mentioned here. These development models try to give assurance that the system
built is secure because it was built by a process that emphasizes security. Neither
of the processes offers a “silver bullet” to secure development and instead just bring
security out to normal software development process.
The security development lifecycle
“The Security Development Lifecycle” (SDL) by Microsoft is a heavy-weight process
for developing secure software. Although adaptable to other types of software, it
is geared towards producing shrink-wrapped software with long release cycles in a
large company.
Before any software development is started, SDL mandates that each developer,
tester and manager must complete a course describing basic concepts of computer
security once a year. At the beginning of a development project, security require-
ments of the upcoming product are assessed and a person or team is charged with
responsibility of managing and tracking the security of the product. Assessing se-
curity requirements means setting a minimum level of acceptable security that can
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never be lowered, based on usage of the product (e.g. what personal information
the product handles).
In design phase, SDL emphasizes following of “best practices”, analyzing risks faced
by the product and adding all security features required to the design. Best practices
mean methods and tools that are seen as the most effective at the task at hand,
for example, in design of control mechanisms, eight design principles described in
Section 3.3.3. Risk analysis, or threat modeling as Microsoft calls it, enables security
designs to better focus on the most important threats and reduces the possibility of
overlooking important security features. Lastly, the design may need to be reviewed
by an by an external reviewer if confidentiality of the personal information that the
product handles warrants such a review.
Implementation phase again emphasizes following “best practices”. Such best prac-
tices can be, for example, avoidance of C programming language functions that are
error-prone or never to develop code that generates warnings from compilers or static
analyzers. Special attention should also be paid to documentation so that users can
use the product securely.
Before the product can be released, verification that the product works as intended
needs to be done. Verification phase includes extensive testing and a “security
push”. Security push, described in detail in [HL03], is an effort to review and update
documentation, code, design and risk analyses for changes that have occurred during
the development.
Testing part consists of normal quality assurance testing reinforced with testing
specifically for security vulnerabilities. One such testing method, promoted by SDL,
is fuzz testing, a testing method where a program is input invalid or random data in
hopes of finding bugs in input handling. This is especially important for programs
written in C or C++ where such bugs can lead to vulnerabilities allowing, for ex-
ample, remote execution of arbitrary code (see buffer overflows, Section 4.3.3). For
a good overview of security testing problems, see [Tho03].
In release phase, there is still one final review of security and privacy. Risk analyses
are verified to include all known threats and severity of known deferred bugs is
re-examined. Responses to vulnerabilities found after release are planned. Then,
finally, comes the release.
Secure web application development process
On the agile front, Ge et al. describe an agile process based on feature-driven
development [GPP+06] that is perhaps more suitable than SDL for small companies
and short release cycles. This process builds on existing feature-driven development
(FDD) framework [PF02] by integrating security specific subtasks to it. Outline of
the process is shown in Figure 4, where original parts of the FDD are marked by
rounded rectangles. In FDD, the last two parts are done iteratively, repeating design
and implementation for each planned feature. Security-enhanced version adds risk
analysis to this iteration and decision of security policy to the start of the project.
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Figure 4: Overview of a secure web application development process. Adapted
from [GPP+06].
Security policy is first set at the start of the project. Security policy is connected to
the other requirements which means that when the requirements change, the policy
needs to be reviewed and updated for possible changes. The other change to FDD
is addition of risk analysis to design of each feature. Risks of a new feature are
analyzed and proper responses decided as described in Section 2.2.4.
Other efforts for security in agile development seem also to focus on forcing devel-
opers to consider what security implications each feature they develop has. Abuse
cases [SBK05] and misuse cases [Kon06] are examples of such development.
3.3.3 Eight principles of secure design
What ever the methodology used to develop software, there are certain principles
that need to be adhered to in order to create secure software. These principles,
first introduced in a seminal work by Saltzer and Schroeder [SS75] describe eight
principles for design and implementation of protection mechanisms. It is good to
notice that the principles are intended for the common situations where integrity
and confidentiality are more important than availability.
The principles are as follows:
Economy of mechanism Simpler designs are easier to get correct. Simple design
allows fewer ways to get either design or implementation wrong. Simple design
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has fewer components and cases to be tested and thus more throughout test-
ing can be done. This principle can easily become overlooked when security
mechanisms are built incrementally or without proper thought.
Fail-safe defaults By default, all access should be denied. All access decisions
should be based on permissions instead of exclusion. Lack of permissions
caused by e.g. misconfiguration is easier to detect and safer than unintended
access that would be allowed by exclusion based access decision. Another view
of this is that should program be unable to complete its goal, the program
should undo the changes it has already made to security state of the system.
Then even a failing program will not compromise system’s security.
Least Privilege Every subject in the system, be it program or user, should work
with the least set of access rights needed for its job. If the subject temporarily
needs more access rights, those rights should be relinquished immediately af-
terwards. This is to limit the damage that might result from implementation
error, accident or deliberate attack.
Complete mediation Each and every access to every object must be checked for
authority. Many contemporary operating systems check permissions only on
the first access of object and cache the results for faster subsequent access
even if the permissions change in the mean time. Combining both caching
and complete mediation requires systematic updating of cached permission
entries and leads to more complex system. This conflict with economy of
mechanism needs to be inspected with healthy amount of skepticism.
Separation of privilege A security mechanism requiring two unrelated conditions
to be met is more robust than a mechanism requiring only one. A single breach
of security will then not be enough to compromise mechanism. This principle
is equivalent to the separation of duty discussed in Section 3.2.4. Requiring
a security token in addition to password to authenticate or needing to know
both root password and to belong to a proper group in order to run programs
as root user are examples of this mechanism.
Open design Security of the system must not depend on the secrecy of its design
or implementation. Both these details can be worked out from disassemblies,
black-box analyses or by non-technical approaches such as break-ins to imple-
menting company.
Least common mechanism: Minimize the number of mechanisms that are shared
among the users. Every shared mechanism represents a potential path to
leak information between users. In desktop operating systems this is partially
implemented: each process has its own virtual memory space but they use
common file system, subject to access control.
Psychological acceptability As humans are often the weakest links in security,
parts of security requiring human interaction should be as easy to do and use
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as possible. Security related program should be intuitive to use, hard if not
impossible to use in insecure manner and should give proper error messages.
As not all concepts in security are simple enough to be explained in a few
sentences and users rarely read error message, preventing incorrect usage may
be the best solution. When creating informative error messages, no additional
information should be divulged: if user entered wrong password when logging
to a system, system should not tell user whether the password or user name
was wrong. Revealing which (or both) were wrong, an attacker would know if
such user name actually existed in the system.
3.4 Threat and Risk analysis tools
Paraphrasing [PP06], risk analysis is the process of analyzing a system and its
deployment environment for threats and what potential harm they can do. There is
some confusion in literature what actually risk analysis consists of as Microsoft uses
term threat modeling [SS04] on what others call as risk analysis.
Before a risk analysis can be done, there need to be some threats to analyze.
Brainstorming threats without a process can cause some categories of threats being
overlooked and thus more structured methods are needed. Three methods described
next are tools to find threats and to estimate risks they give rise to.
3.4.1 Attack trees
Attack trees are a tool to describe and assess security of a system or a part of the
system, introduced by Schneier [Sch99] and later formalized by Mauw and Oostdjik
[MO05]. Attack trees aim to help understanding what goals attacks have, what
attacks are likely to occur and what security assumptions underlie the system’s
security.
Attack trees are goal-oriented: a single attack tree has a root that is the goal of
the attack, internal nodes that describe subgoals of the attack and leaf nodes that
correspond to actions through which the (sub)goals are achieved. This orientation
forces analyst to think like a attacker, to find a way some concrete goal such as “get
company information” instead of “attack company web server”.
If edges to child nodes are denoted with an edge as in Figure 5 then all the denoted
subgoals must be fulfilled (and-nodes). Without the edge the child nodes are com-
plementary: only one of the nodes needs to be true for the parent node to be true.
The edges and nodes can also have additional information such as edges carrying
the probability of the attack’s success or carrying the cost of an attack to reach the
subgoal (as in Figure 5). Adding this information is best done bottom-up: add costs
and probabilities to leaf nodes and edges and propagate them towards the root.
Attack trees help to visualize the whole security perimeter and being easy to un-
derstand, attack trees communicate the threats well. Easy communication help
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Figure 5: Attack tree for breaking a safe with costs and other requirements for
subgoals. Red shows the attack requiring no special equipment and orange cheapest
one. Adapted from [Sch99]
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creation of good attack trees as the whole security assessment does not depend on
one analyst for others can create subtrees of the attack tree. For example, a network
security specialist can create an attack tree on attacking a system through network
while a physical security specialist creates an attack tree describing different threats
of physical penetration. These trees can then be combined to create a larger tree
depicting system’s security issues from physical and network view. This also works
within same types of security issues as subgoals can be combined under same parent
goal to form a wider attack tree.
All in all, creating attack trees is a good way to start the assessment of the sys-
tem’s security and when implemented using a computer software that does the
cost-propagation automatically, quite easy to keep up-to-date.
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3.4.2 Architectural risk analysis
McGraw describes architectural risk analysis as a necessity [McG06] as about half
of the security problems stem from design flaws. Instead of ad-hoc analysis of archi-
tecture, McGraw describes an analysis process used by Cigital, a software security
consultancy. The process takes a high-level view of the system, ignoring code-level
problems, and tries to find out whether fundamentals of the system are in order.
First part of the process is to create a one-page overview of the system’s architecture.
Sometimes such an overview exists, but more often it needs to be developed through
interviews and other data available of the architecture (partial documents, pictures,
code).
After this is done, the actual analysis of architecture can begin. The analysis can
be divided into three sub-processes:
1. Attack resistance analysis
2. Ambiguity analysis
3. Weakness analysis
Attack resistance analysis
First of the sub processes, Attack resistance analysis, is based on Microsoft’s STRIDE
approach [HL02] and pits known attacks, attack patterns and vulnerabilities against
high-level view of the system. First, general flaws are searched using secure design
literature and different attack types (as in 2.2.3) as checklists. Next, common
methods to exploit software, called attack patterns, that are applicable to analyzed
software need to be mapped.
This mapping can be done either using misuse or abuse case development [SO05,
MF99] or using ready lists such as Common Weakness Enumeration [Mar07] that
offer a taxonomy for vulnerabilities. Lastly, risks in the architecture need to be
identified and evaluated, and known attacks understood. Attack resistance analysis
is good for finding known problems but not for finding new types of attack.
Ambiguity analysis
Ambiguity analysis tries to find ambiguities in the way the system works or should
work. In ambiguity analysis at least two persons separately ponder how the sys-
tem or parts of it work, joining for a session to describe the system to each other
analysis. Explicit explaining of the system’s workings will bring up disagreements
and misunderstandings which point to places of further analysis for weaknesses as
hard-to-understand parts are hard to implement and use correctly. Ambiguity anal-
ysis, like code review that it strongly resembles, helps to pin-point parts of the code
that could use economy of mechanism, fail-safe defaults and other design principles
(Section 3.3.3) aiming for secure code. Ambiguity analysis may be the hardest part
of the process to do right: McGraw notes that this sub process is best done with a
team of very experienced analysts and best learned in an apprenticeship.
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Weakness analysis
Weakness analysis sub process aims to understand the dependencies a piece of soft-
ware has on external software and on the environment the software is run in. As
most of the software is not written from ground up to a self-made microprocessor
without an operating system, run-time environments, third party libraries, oper-
ating systems and environment all affect security of the software. As discussed in
Section 3.3, some of these need to be trusted, but it is wise to consider at least
what impact misplaced trust on third party libraries can have on the system. An
important realization here is that it is not enough to just keep one’s own code safe
but that one needs also to track weaknesses in other software that is used, using,
for example, security lists or computer security companies advisories.
All together, architectural risk analysis as described by McGraw is a step forward
from ad-hoc approaches so common today. There is one problem, however. De-
scription of Cigital’s architectural risk analysis was frugal and seemed more like a
marketing brochure as it created interest but did not specify process’ implementa-
tion in enough detail. It probably is not meant as a marketing brochure and the
opaqueness may be a sign that architectural risk analysis not being a fully specified
process but is taught in an apprenticeship situation, as noted by McGraw.
Whereas architectural risk analysis took a whole program high-level view, attack
surface measurement looks software from the point of data flow.
3.4.3 Attack surface measurement
It is common wisdom, codified in “economy of mechanism”-principle, that simpler
systems are easier to secure. In the same way, the less of the system is exposed, the
less there are places for possible vulnerabilities. Based on this thought, Howard et
al. [HPW03] proposed the system’s attack surface, the amount of system exposed
to the world, as a metric of a system’s security. This metric was further formalized
and validated by Manadhata et al. [MTMW07, MKW08].
Exposition of attack surface measurement methodology here follows closely the ones
given by Manadhata et al. First we need some definitions. Let S be the set of all
systems, s be the system we are currently interested in and T be the set of all systems
excluding s (T = S\{s}). Additionally we have user U and data store D used by
all systems in S. Tuple (U,D, T ) is the environment of s called Es (see Figure 6)
and is the basis for rest of the definitions needed for attack surface measurement.
Each of the systems in S has its own set of operations, each returning some output
for and receiving arguments as input. These operations can be invoked by anyone
in the environment. Additionally each system also has some set of communication
channels that allow other systems and users to communicate with the system, such
as TCP sockets, RPC facilities and named pipes.
Entry point is a operation, named m, used by system to receive data from system’s
environment. Entry point can either be direct or indirect.
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Figure 6: System s and its environment Es
Operation m is a direct entry point if:
1. either user U or system s1 invokes m and directly passes data to it.
2. or m reads data directly from data store D.
3. or m invokes operation moutside on system s1 and receives data as a
result from it.
Operation m is an indirect entry point if m receives data directly from op-
eration m1 that m1 has either received directly from environment Es or
indirectly from another operation m2.
For example, on a public web server, operation doing user authentication based
on the user name and password a user has supplied is a direct entry point. Sys-
tem’s logging operation that logs every login attempt could be indirect entry
point if authentication operation would pass it the user name and password it
has received from a user.
Exit point is a operation that sends data back to system’s environment. Similarly
to entry points, exit point can either be direct or indirect and the classification
is quite the same.
Operation m is a direct exit point if:
1. either user U or system s1 invokes m and receives data as a result
from m.
2. m writes data directly to data store D.
3. m invokes operation moutside on system s1 and passes data as param-
eters to it.
Operation m is an indirect exit point if m passes data directly to m1 that m1
either passes directly to environment Es or passes to another operation
m2 that passes it indirectly to Es.
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As an example, a operation that writes to a log file is a direct exit point whereas
a operation that gives current user name to a operation that creates a web
page is an indirect exit point.
Untrusted data of a system s is data that s’s direct entry point reads from D or
s’s direct exit point writes to D.
Attack surface of a system s consists of a set of entry and exit points Ms of s,
of s’s channels Cs and of untrusted data Is that s uses. This set of resources
that attackers can use either to send data to system or receive data from it is
denoted with tuple (Ms, Cs, Is).
Measuring Attack Surface
Simplest way of measuring a system’s attack surface is counting the number of
resources that constitute the attack surface. Yet it is clear that this straightforward
operation overestimates the attack surface as it does not take into account differences
between the resources, e.g. different operations may run on different privileges and
different channels may have different amount of trust placed on them. This problem
can be amended by estimating the contribution each resource has to the attack
surface using damage potential-effort ratio. Damage potential is the amount of
damage an attacker could cause to the system using the resource in an attack. How
this damage is measured depends on the purpose of analysis: it can be technical
impact (e.g. privilege escalation) or monetary loss. Effort measures the amount of
work the attacker needs to do to acquire necessary access rights so that the resource
can be used in an attack. Damage potential-effort ratio, der, estimates the resources
contribution to the system’s attack surface.
Summing over all there der-values gives us algorithm for attack surface measure-
ment:
1. Given system s and its environment Es, identify its attack surface (Ms, Cs, Is).
2. Estimate damage potential-effort ratio, derm(m) for each operation, derc(c)
for each channel and derd(d) for each datum.
3. Sum over different damage to potential-effort ratios for each resource type to
get the measure of attack surface: (
∑
m∈M
derm(m),
∑
c∈C
derc(c)
∑
d∈I
, derd(d)).
Now only part left is the hardest part: estimating the damage potential and required
effort. This part is highly subjective, but Manadhata et al. [MTMW07] give some
advice for it:
Usually there is at least partial ordering between different privileges operations can
be called, between different protocols channels can use and between different types of
data. For privileges, for example, the operation may be called with root user, normal
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user or restricted user privileges. Respectively a channel may have no restrictions
on the traffic allowed (a raw TCP socket) or allow only one type of traffic (e.g.
HTTP proxy). Additionally these resources can have different access rights, such
as reading/writing sockets, and these all things need to be taken into account when
estimating the damage potential and the required effort for each resource.
Manadhata et. al suggest a numeric value of 3 + k ∗ ∆current,lowest for damage to
potential-effort ratio based on the IMAP and FTP servers they studied [MTMW07].
On choosing k, Manadhata et. al suggest choosing values near 10 for privilege levels
and between 10 and 20 for access rights. As choosing k can seem quite arbitrary and
hard to estimate, it is a good idea to do sensitivity analysis for results. Manadhata
et. al found that in cases where number of entry- and exit-points are similar between
compared servers, emphasizing access rights or privileges using different k values can
alter the results, but when the difference in entry- and exit-points between measured
programs is “large”, values of k do not matter.
Although attack surface is a metric for comparing security of different systems, it
can also be used to the security of a single system. In such case, we will skip
the summing step in measuring operation and instead just estimate the damage
potential-effort ratios.
3.5 Conclusion
This section discussed both how to create secure systems and how to assess systems’
security.
Important part of applications that allow multiple users to share data is access con-
trol. This section reviewed access control models emphasizing either confidentiality
(Bell-La Padula) or integrity (Biba and Clark-Wilson) and introduced two models
with other priorities (Role-based access control and a model for database privacy).
Other way to group the models is to note that Biba models and Bell-La Padula
model are useful in military or government usage as they inhibit flow of informa-
tion. The other models are more useful in other organizations such as companies
where both the integrity of the data and the ability to share it are important.
Building secure software requires more than just good access control. Section 3.3 re-
viewed problems of creating secure software, solutions in form of development models
for secure software and in form of good design principles. As with other software
development models, there is no single development model that fits everyone.
Finally, methods for assessing security of a program were introduced. Attack surface
measurement and architectural risk analysis help finding weaknesses in the software.
Attack trees allow composition of separate security sectors to a comprehensive model
of whole system’s security. The methods are usable together: attack tree is composed
of weaknesses found in attack surface measurement and architectural risk analysis.
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4 Web Applications: overview and security con-
siderations
Nowadays, most companies and organizations offer their services in the Web, but
this has not always been the case. Initially, all the interlinked pages in the Web
were generated off-line, either manually or by a generator program. By 1995 need
for dynamically generated web pages was clear and common gateway interface 1.1
(CGI/1.1) protocol was one answer to the problem.
CGI established a common protocol for interfacing to external software from the web
server and allowed dynamic content: automatic generation of web pages and data
contained within them. This can be considered as the birth of web applications as
content of the pages was dynamic and could react to input from users and marked
rise of web browsers as universal clients. While the content was dynamic, users’
experience was less so: every interaction with the application, represented as a
web page, required reloading of the whole page. This changed fast after a browser
company named Netscape introduced client-side scripting language JavaScript in
1995.
Before JavaScript, web pages earning to be more dynamic had to resort to usage of
browser plug-ins that had the downside of requiring a separate download and instal-
lation and had limited platform support, usually just Windows systems. Client-side
scripting by JavaScript brought functionality and effects that had before only been
possible through these plug-ins to all browsers that supported JavaScript.
JavaScript and later, XMLHttprequest (Section 4.2.3) allowed changes on web pages
to happen without reloading the whole web page and brought web applications closer
to normal desktop applications in usability and speed. This fluidity combined with
dynamic scripting languages such as Perl and PHP and with template engines eased
the creation of interactive applications and brought them closer to their desktop
brethren in usability. Ease of developing such applications also lead to large amount
of security problems in web applications that harmed the applications, their users,
or both as many of the web application developers did not know the security issues
of the web applications.
This leads us to this thesis’ main theme, security of the web applications. Before
tackling the case study (Section 5), we need to understand how web applications and
vulnerabilities in them work which requires understanding the technology behind
web applications. This chapter will first introduce HTTP, the protocol responsible
for transferring data between a user and a website, and its secure brethren, HTTPS.
After that, JavaScript and other technologies indispensable modern web applica-
tions, such as state management, are described. Finally, we present a high-level
view of a typical modern web application and of typical security problems such an
application contains.
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4.1 Static pillars of the Web
The two most important technologies making up the Web are are HTTP with its
secure sibling HTTPS, the protocols used to serve data in the Web, and HTML, the
mark-up language used to describe the web pages a web browser shows.
HTML, abbreviation from hypertext markup language, is the most common markup
language used to describe web pages. HTML document is a text document consisting
of nested elements, marked by HTML tags such as <HTML> and this document is then
rendered by the browser for graphical presentation. Basic understanding of HTML
is presupposed here as it is not discussed here further except in context of DOM in
Section 4.2.2.
4.1.1 Workhorse of the Web: Introduction to HTTP
The World-Wide Web and the Internet hardly need any introduction on this day and
age. Still, a few words may be in order from the technical side. The World-Wide Web
is a set of hypertext documents that are accessed through the Internet. Internet itself
is a global network of computers interconnected using a standard Internet Protocol
suite. For simplification, it can be said that every computer connected to the Internet
needs to have at least one IP-address that is used only by it. Additionally, this
computer may have one or more domain names, also called hostnames, that map
an ASCII text to IP-address. These computers communicate with each other using
protocols from Internet Protocol suite, such as HTTP.
The hypertext transfer protocol (HTTP) is, quoting Fielding et al. [FGM+99], “an
application-level protocol for distributed, collaborative, hypermedia information sys-
tems.” It is probably the most familiar protocol to casual users of the Internet, being
the protocol used to serve web pages.
When Alice types address www.example.com to her web browser to direct it to load
that page, she actually instructs the browser to make a request to www.example.com
server. Server then responds to this request by sending a response that Alice’s
browser then renders to her screen.
Say, a user named Alice wants to visit address www.example.com with her web
browser. She first types www.example.com to the address bar of her web browser
(part 1 in Figure 7) and presses enter. Alice’s browser, that is, her User Agent
in more technical language, reads the address Alice has written on her browsers
location bar and constructs an URI2 from it. Based on this URI, Alice’s browser
checks what domain name is required and looks up IP address mapped to that
domain name (part 2). Alice’s browser then sends TCP packets containing the
request line and headers (part 3) to the IP address looked up. When server has
2 Uniform resource identifier is a string of characters that specify location and access of resources
in the Internet. URI consists of two parts: scheme, a colon separator and scheme specific part.
In our example, scheme would be “http” and scheme specific part “www.example.com:80/”. For
more thorough explanation, see [MDW02].
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Alice
www.example.com
web server
Alice’s computer
3. Request
GET / HTTP/1.1
Host: www.example.com
4. Response
HTTP/1.0 200 OK
Content-Length : 12
Hello World!
1. Types in 
www.example.com
2. Looks up address of 
www.example.com
Status-Line HeaderRequest-Line
Colors used
Entity Body
Figure 7: Alice types in www.example.com to her browser.
received the request, it reacts to it. In this case, Alice only has a simple “GET”-
request where she only wants to get the root page (“/”) of the server. Server reacts
to this request by sending a response containing Status-Line, headers and possibly
an Entity Body containing the actual page in HTML as in part 4 of Figure 7.
Depending on the response her browser receives, she may see a page rendered by
her browser, an error message or some other response that can for example cause
her browser request the same page from different address. After Alice has received
her response to her request, this request is complete and server is allowed to forget
about Alice.
Content of response and request messages is listed in Table 4. What a response or
request message, such as what Alice sent and received, contains in its fullest is listed
in Table 4. It should be noted that in the table, <CRLF> stands for carriage return
character followed by a line feed character and it is used to separate each message
line from others. Of the parts of a HTTP message, we are only interested in the
request line, and in the request- and response-headers.
Request line
The request line lists the HTTP method used in the request. The latest specification
of HTTP, HTTP 1.1 specified in RFC-2616 [FGM+99], defines 8 different HTTP
methods, of which we are interested only in a few: GET, HEAD and POST. Of
these, GET and HEAD are idempotent, meaning that N > 0 requests of those
methods should have the same side-effect as a single request.
The GET method is the most common of the methods. The GET method tells the
server to return the information identified by Request-URI in the responses entity-
body. It should not result in any other significant action other than those required
for the retrieval. As such behavior is not mandated by the RFC-2616, some web
applications have used GET for other purposes. One such example is usage of GET
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Part of the message Examples
Request line specifies method,
Request-URI and HTTP version
of a request
GET /index.html HTTP/1.1<CRLF>
Status-line specific HTTP
version, Status-Code and
Reason-Phrase of a response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK<CRLF>
General-header fields specify
headers usable both in requests
and responses
Transfer-Encoding: utf-8<CRLF>
Date: Tue, 15 Nov 1994 08:12:31 GMT <CRLF>
. . .
Request-header fields specify
headers usable only in requests
Cookie: user=foo<CRLF>
Host: www.example.com <CRLF>
Response-header fields specify
headers usable only in
responses
Set-Cookie: user=foo<CRLF>
ETag: ”b80f4-1b6-80bfd280”<CRLF>
Entity-header fields carry
information about the
entity-body or about the
resource identified by the
request.
Content-Length: 12<CRLF>
Content-Encoding: text/plain <CRLF>
. . .
. . .
. . .
End of headers <CRLF>
Entity-body contains the
“payload” of the request or
response.
<HTML><BODY>Hello!</BODY></HTML>
Table 4: HTTP Request or Response message
to delete data named in request-URI from the server, leading to problems if user-
agent supposes that GET will just return data and for example pre-fetches such
resources, causing deletion of all such resources named in a web page.
The HEAD method is like GET method except that server response must not contain
message body. Response should be identical to a one from a GET request, save the
missing message body, so that HEAD request can be used to get only the metadata
of the page that is specified in the headers. A HEAD request can be, for example,
used to check staleness of local cache or validity of a linked page.
The POST method submits data to the server to be placed under the resource
identified by Request-URI. As an example, URI identifies a discussion thread on a
message board and POSTed data becomes a new message within that thread. Data
send to server is enclosed in entity-body and its length is signaled by “Content-
Length” Entity-header. Although semantically meant to update resource pointed
by URI, it is used as a generic method for uploading data to server.
These three HTTP methods cover most of the requests made in the Web and all
that we will need for our web application. The other interesting parts, request- and
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response-headers, being integral to state handling in web applications, are covered
later in Section 4.2.4.
4.1.2 Confidentiality in the Web: HTTPS and PKI
HTTP sends all its messages, its requests and responses, in plain text. A request sent
to example.com from Finland would pass through twenty or so different computers
of which only few nearest computers could easily be checked for trustworthiness.
All the computers in-between client and the server can arbitrarily read, modify,
readdress and drop those requests and responses. This means that neither confi-
dentiality nor integrity and especially not availability is assured when using HTTP.
This is all fine as long as users and servers serving them don’t have such expec-
tations. For many uses, however, this situation is simply not acceptable. Enter
HTTPS, the secure brethren of HTTP that fixes the confidentiality and integrity
problems of HTTP. HTTPS provides confidentiality through public-key cryptogra-
phy3 and public-key infrastructure, and integrity through message authentication
codes (MACs) [DA99, Res00].
Simplification of public-key cryptography can be stated as follows: it is a crypto-
graphic approach where each participant has two keys, private key kpriv and public
key kpub with following properties
M = D(kpriv, E(kpub,M)) and M = D(kpub, E(kpriv,M)),
where M is the message, E is the encryption and D the decryption function. With
the assumption that it is, for all practical purposes, impossible to get kpriv from kpub
we have a system where a participant, be she named Alice, is the only one who can
create messages that can be decrypted with her public key and only one able to read
messages encrypted with her public key. Only problem left is how people wishing
to communicate with Alice can get her authentic public-key as wrong key can lead
to spoofing attacks where some third party purports to be Alice. This is called the
key distribution problem.
HTTPS uses public-key cryptography similar to the one described and answers they
key distribution problem with public-key infrastructure. In public-key infrastruc-
ture, there exists certification authorities that certify that a given key belongs to a
given entity.
How it works in the Web, is shown in Figure 8. In the Web there are some top-level
certification authorities (CA for short) whose certificates (called root certificates)
are distributed with all the browsers. These certificates contain information such
3 Cryptography is the art and science of secret writing. Historically cryptography has very much
meant ways to secure messages’ confidentiality, but nowadays it is also used to provide integrity and
non-repudiation. As cryptography is a highly mathematical discipline and such treatment would
not serve this thesis, only its usage is illustrated here. Readers more interested in cryptography
should start with Schneier’s Applied Cryptography [Sch96] and for more mathematical treatment,
[Sti06, MvOV01].
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Internet
Figure 8: PKI as used in the Web
as the name of the CA, their public key and a digital signature of the certificate.
These certification authorities then certify websites and other, lesser, certification
authorities who then again certify other certification authorities or websites.
Now, when a user visits a web page using HTTPS, the server serving the page
sends user its certificate. In this certificate, the digital signature is a digest of the
certificate encrypted with CA’s private key and thus decryptable with CA’s public
key. User’s browser can thus easily verify that the server is trusted: if CA’s public
key decrypts the signature to a digest identical to what user’s browser calculates
from the rest of the certificate, CA vouches that the server is who it professes to be.
Usage of HTTPS as such is not enough to make web application secure. HTTPS just
ensures that web application’s security problems do not stem from clients talking to
wrong servers or getting their messages read or modified, if the assumptions of the
PKI hold.
These assumptions are two-fold: no one but the certification authority itself can
digitally sign certificates with that authority’s key and that certification authorities
issue certificates certifying that website Y is X only when Y is X. Both of these
assumptions have been shown to be false on some specific occasions: Stevents et
al. [SSA+09] created certificates that seemed to be signed by certification authority
and on some occasions, lesser certification authorities have created domain certifi-
cates by request of someone not owning the domain.
Despite these problems, HTTPS is usually the strongest link in web application
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security. Credit for being the weakest link often goes to dynamic parts of the web
application developed by the application developers themselves.
4.2 Dynamic web technologies.
Web application is an application that lives at least partially in user’s browser. Web
applications can either be developed to use only technologies native to browsers or
to require plug-ins such as Flash or Java.
As early browsers were quite limited in their interactivity, developers that wanted
to users of their website to have more fluid experience needed to use browser plug-
ins. Using such plug-ins had the upside that instead of user submitting a text in a
form and waiting for a new page to load, the users could use web applications with
speed and interactivity rivaling those of applications running on users’ desktop.
The downside for web application developers was that that the users needed to have
corresponding plug-in installed and enabled and the downside for user was that plug-
ins often crashed the browser and had security problems and those again slowed the
adoption of such plug-ins.
Nowadays such problems are much forgotten because plug-ins are more mature and,
more importantly, because most of the web applications use technologies native to
browsers. Browsers have caught up with plug-ins on what graphics and level of
interactivity they can offer to users, mostly because of computers tens of times
faster than during the early days of web and because of few key technologies such
as JavaScript, DOM and Ajax that well study next. We will limit ourselves only to
web applications utilizing such technologies.
Of the web browser technologies, none, save perhaps HTTP and HTML described
earlier, are more important than JavaScript, the scripting language supported by
all modern web browsers.
4.2.1 JavaScript
JavaScript is a scripting language developed at Netscape Communications and re-
leased 1995 with their Netscape Navigator client. It is the most important client-side
programming language used in web, partly because it can easily modify web page
DOM (See Section 4.2.2) and because it is the only one that is widely supported
on all browsers. As a programming language, JavaScript can be categorized as a
prototype-based multi-paradigm programming language that took its major ideas
from Self and Scheme [wg]. Syntactically it is C-based but is otherwise much closer
to languages such as Ruby, Scheme and Lua that have garbage-collection, first-class
functions and other rich runtime features.
First important feature of JavaScript is its capability of first-class functions, meaning
that JavaScript supports same operations on functions as it does on other objects:
binding them to variables, creating and passing them as parameters and return
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values in functions during runtime. These features are illustrated in listing 1.
Listing 1: Functions in JavaScript
function generato r ( i ) {
return function ( ) {
var tmp = i ;
i = i +1;
return tmp ;
}
}
var from one = genera tor ( 1 ) ;
var f i r s t v a l = from one ( ) ; // f i r s t v a l i s now 1
In the end of the code snippet, first val is 1 but subsequent calls to from one will
return 2,3, . . . as variable i is bound to the environment of unnamed function within
generator-function. First-class functions allow idiomatic use of functional program-
ming, a programming style that eschews side-effects to achieve modularity [Hug89].
Another defining feature of JavaScript is its prototype-based behavior reuse. Instead
of inheritance based reuse common in many object-oriented programming languages,
such as Java, Smalltalk and C++, reuse in JavaScript is realized by cloning existing
objects. New objects in JavaScript are created either through constructor functions,
such as cloning functions, or from nothingness using object literal syntax.
Listing 2: Creating new objects in JavaScript
/∗Create o b j e c t v e h i c l e from noth ing us ing
∗ o b j e c t l i t e r a l syntax . ∗/
var v e h i c l e = {name : ” General v e h i c l e ” } ;
function Clone ( ) { }
function c lone ( obj ) {
Clone . prototype = obj ;
return new Clone ( ) ;
}
var car = c lone ( v e h i c l e ) ;
car . wheels = 4 ; // car now has proper ty ”whee l s ”
This is demonstrated in Listing 2 where first object vehicle is created out of nothing
and then object car is cloned from it. Object property name in car is first looked
up in car and if it does not exist in it, in car’s prototype vehicle. If property
“name” were not found there either, this prototype-chain would be walked through
until either the property is found or some object’s prototype is undefined in which
case the searched property too is undefined. In this case, however, name is found
in vehicle so car.name returns “General vehicle”. If name property is changed in
vehicle, it changes also in car as they refer to the same thing, unless car’s name
is set to point to something else first.
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4.2.2 Document Object Model
If JavaScript could not manipulate web pages and their graphics, it would not be
much of a use to web applications. Clearly this is not the case: JavaScript can
manipulate the whole web page, all the graphics and text within it using DOM
API. DOM stands for Document object model and is an object model that describes
XML or HTML documents as a tree and allows programmatic manipulation of such
documents using its application programming interface (API).
Listing 3: Sample HTML document
< HTML >< HEAD ></HEAD >
< BODY >
< ANAME = ”#s t a r t ”>Star t</A > o f the document .
< DIV ID = ” unique ”>
Some text here .
</DIV >
</BODY >
</HTML >
Consider a HTML-page in Listing 3. If we wanted to get HTML inside <A> anchor
element, we can get it by reading DOM tree as shown in Listing 4. Should we want to
change this text to something else, just setting firstTag.firstChild.nodeValue
to something else would change the text in shown web page.
Listing 4: Reading text inside anchor element
var a l lTags = document . getElementsByTagName ( ”A” ) ;
var f i r s t T a g = a l lTags [ 0 ] ;
var textValue = f i r s t T a g . f i r s t C h i l d . nodeValue ;
Now, if only data could be send and read from web application server without
reloading and re-posting pages, web applications using JavaScript to manipulate
DOM could work as dynamically as normal desktop applications. Luckily, when
developing Outlook Web Access 2000, Microsoft created a concept that does just
that: a JavaScript object called XMLHttprequest [Hop07].
4.2.3 Ajax
Ajax stands for Asynchronous JavaScript and XML and is a group of related browser
technologies that allow creation of web applications with interactivity close to that
of desktop applications. The abbreviation was originally coined and defined in an
essay by Jesse Garrett [Gar05] and brought two new technologies to web application
development: XML as a data interchange format and XMLHttprequest as an asyn-
chronous data retrieval method. XMLHttprequest is the more interesting of these
two as XML is just a data container and currently has a lighter rival called JSON.
XMLHttprequest adds interactivity by allowing data transfer to happen asynchronously,
without page loading. Figure 9 shows a life cycle of one such XMLHttprequest.
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XMLHttprequest object is first created in JavaScript to send a request (usually
GET or POST request) to the server and its onreadystatechange property is set
to a callback function that we want to run after successful response. This request is
then send by calling send property on the object and JavaScript interpreter moves
onwards. Only when response to the request is received, does the JavaScript inter-
preter call XMLHttprequest object’s onreadystatechange function which then can
update JavaScript variables and DOM to display new results.
ServerClient
Create XMLHttpRequest object
Make request
Application continues normally
Receive response
Callback processes response: 
modifies DOM, logic, etc.
Figure 9: Life cycle of an XMLHttprequest
Last problem remaining is representation of the web applications state. As long as
the application does anything more than just saves files or text that user sends to
the server, the application needs to keep track of state. State of the application
means recording what choices the user has made earlier to the extent they might
be needed later in the application. As HTTP is designed to be a stateless protocol,
state needs to be carried on some other level than protocol level.
4.2.4 State in Web applications
State in web applications means the same as in desktop applications: what mod-
ification the user has done, who the user is, what operation are we executing just
now, etc. HTTP being stateless, it cannot be trusted to hold the state and instead
web applications need to handle the state themselves. The are two possibilities to
handle the state on the client or on the server.
The first possibility is implemented in web applications following representational
state transfer style (REST) [Fie00]. In such applications, data of the application
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is represented as HTTP resources and manipulated using different HTTP methods,
for example resource http://example.com/resources/cars/ denotes all cars and
http://example.com/resources/cars/1231 would denote a specific car. Then, a
request with GET method would return a description of this specific car and request
with DELETE method would remove the car.
The other choice is to have the server hold the state, stored in a data structure
called session. The session-based methods are discussed more deeply as our case
study employed sessions (Section 5.3.1). As each user of the application has her
own session, these sessions need to be mapped to users. This mapping is done by a
session identifier, a string that is unique to each user having a session on the server.
This session identifier can be stored in three different ways: using URI encoding,
hidden forms or, most importantly, cookies.
Session encoding in URI or hidden forms
State encoding in URI or hidden forms is nowadays mostly used only when cookies
cannot be used for some reason. In URI encoding, the data is appended in the
resource part of an URI (http://example.com/re/sour/ce) as this value is passed
back and forth between client and server. In hidden forms technique, session infor-
mation is carried in each of the web application’s pages in a form element hidden
from view. Both have some downsides: URI encoding makes sharing URIs hard
and staying logged in a service is hard in both. If session identifier is encoded in
URI, then Alice has to manually sanitize URI she sends to her Carol, otherwise
Carol can act as Alice in the application; Alice needs to manually remove the part
identifying her session from link before she can send it Carol (e.g. (?sid) from
http://example.com/resource?sid=aEdNcAMqDjqA).
Because of these downsides, these techniques are usually only used when cookies
cannot be used.
Session encoding in Cookies
Cookies have neither of the above-mentioned problems. A cookie is a string of text
send back and forth between the server and client. First version of cookies was
informally specified by Netscape Communications in their Mosaic Netscape 0.9 beta
and more formally in RFC 2109 [KM97] which was later theoretically made obsolete
by RFC 2965 [KM00]. In practice, only few browsers and websites support RFC
2965 cookie mechanism. Cookies are transferred in HTTP headers: a cookie is set by
server using Set-Cookie response header and sent back to server in Cookie request
header.
Before more details are exposed, an example of cookie use in web store is shown
to illustrate the concepts. Here only headers that are integral to the example are
shown.
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1. User logs in by filling user name and password form fields and clicking “login”-
button. User Agent sends the corresponding request.
POST /store/login HTTP/1.1
[Entity-body containing form data]
Here Entity-body contains data from both the user name and password fields.
2. Server acknowledges user’s logging in and responds to User Agent by settings
a cookie to reflect user’s identity.
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Set-Cookie: User="Alfred_J_Kwak"; Path="/store"
Here server restricts the cookie only to paths with prefix /store. The cookie
could also be set using JavaScript. In that case the sent response would contain
an Entity-body with following JavaScript snippet:
document.cookie = ’User = "Alfred_J_Kwak"’;
document.cookie = ’Path = "/store"’;
3. User Agent adds an item to shopping basket.
GET /store/additem?id=3 HTTP/1.1
Cookie: User="Alfred_J_Kwak"; $Path="/store"
The old cookie is sent to server as /store is prefix of /store/pickitem?id=3.
4. Server then acknowledges the action and adds selected item to session cookie
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Set-Cookie: Id1=3:Qu1=1:User=Alfred_J_Kwak; Path="/store"
Here It1 and Qu1 mean the identifier and quantity of the first item in the
shopping basket.
5. User decides that it is time to order, selects a shipping method from menu and
clicks “Order” button.
POST /store/checkout HTTP/1.1
Cookie: Id1=3:Qu1=1:User=Alfred_J_Kwak; $Path="/store"
[Form data specifying UPS as the courier]
6. Server reads name of the courier from Entity-body and user’s address from its
database. It then adds a job to another service to send selected items to chosen
address using UPS. As items in the shopping basket are already bought, there
is no further use for them and they are discarded.
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HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Set-Cookie: User="Alfred_J_Kwak"; Path="/store"
User is still logged in and able to do further purchases but this transaction is
complete.
In the example, cookies are used to store user’s identity and what products the user
has selected from the web store. These values are saved in one or more comma-
separated name:value pairs that need to be kept confidential. This confidentiality
is enforced by variety of cookie access rules.
Without any qualifiers, browser sends cookies only if hostname part of the page
URI matches stored hostname of the cookie. For example: a cookie set by http:
//example.com is send to page example.com/~user but not to www.example.com
even if they are the same server. As such a coarse-grained policy can cause both
confidentiality and usability problems, scope of the cookies can be controlled in a
more fine-grained way by three attributes: Path, Domain and Secure.
Path attribute can be used to restrict the allowed paths only to paths that have
the same prefix as given attribute value. So Alice (http://example.com/~alice)
could prevent Mallory (http://example.com/~mallory) from reading her cookies
by appending Path="/~alice" to her cookie.
Domain attribute allows different sub-domains to access the same cookie: normally
store.example.com cannot read login cookie set by login.example.com but ap-
pending “Domain=".example.com"” to Set-Cookie header allows different sub-
domains of example.com to read the cookie. If this value does not start with a
dot, dot is prepended to the value set. Now if domain value starts with a dot (it is
set explicitly) and is of form .a.b where a.b is not a top-level domain, this cookie is
send to all websites with hostname of form c.a.b, d.c.a.b, etc., but not to websites of
form hostname a.b. Hostname a.b is only matched with implicit domain in a cookie
send by a.b.
Lastly, Secure attribute denotes that cookie should only be sent back to server using
at least as secure channel as was used to receive the cookie. In practice this means
that cookies that are set using HTTPS connection with Secure attribute are not
sent over normal HTTP connection.
Being used to save confidential information such as user credentials or session iden-
tifiers, cookies have been common attack targets. These attacks have usually been
tied to incorrect cookie settings such as Secure attribute not being set or to web ap-
plications JavaScript handling vulnerabilities, such as Cross-Site Scripting (Section
4.3.5).
Now with being able to handle applications state, all ingredients needed for web
applications have been introduced.
50
4.3 Web applications
4.3.1 Common architecture
Conceptually, web applications can be thought to consist of three tiers:
1. Persistence tier serves data and saves the changes users have done to the data.
2. Processing tier handles the information processing that usually is application’s
main task.
3. Interface tier displays application’s user interface: it visualizes the data sent
to it by processing layer and transmits users’ commands back to processing
layer.
Where these tiers actually reside in the web application varies from one extreme to
another: from an implementation where the client loads a JavaScript from server and
this script contains the whole application to an implementation where user uploads
a file to the server and is redirected to another page containing the results. In the
first extreme, all of the application is run on the client end and in latter one, on the
server end.
As interesting security issues appear only when the client is not handling all the data,
we will focus only on such cases. Setup of such a web application running in the
Internet is shown in Figure 10. An important part of such applications is retrieving
Database
server
Web application
server
Internet
Users
Other computers connected to Internet
(2) Information processing
(1) Information persistence
(3) Interface
Figure 10: Deployment of a typical web application in the Internet
data from the database and displaying it in some form to the users in their interface.
This is done through web pages and the web pages need to be generated at least
partially based on the user and data in the database (Alice needs to see a different
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welcome page than Carol). Most common way to generate these web pages is to use
a template engine.
As shown in Figure 11, template engine takes a template for the page user requested
and generates a HTML page based on information in the database and in the session.
The templates template engine uses are a mixture of HTML and template language,
latter being responsible for all the dynamic content.
Produce a page
Template engine
Webpage 
Hello 
Jane!
DatabaseTemplate
Hello {$x}!
Webpage
Hello 
Tim!
Webpage
Hello 
Mary!
Jane
Supply user
information
Select the correct
template
Request
Log in
Response
A welcome
page
Figure 11: Template engine generates web pages dynamically from database data.
Template engines are not required for creation of dynamic web applications for all
HTML could be generated programmatically. This approach has logic and presenta-
tion in the same place, whereas usage of template language allows interface designers
to create interface separately using HTML and template language and developers
to focus on creation of the actual application logic elsewhere.
In web applications, all data served from the server is allowed to do same things:
to read cookies specific to the website serving the application, make actions behalf
of the user, etc. To be able to use such web applications, users choose to trust the
server but what they do not choose to trust is the other users of the application.
All web applications need to ascertain is that this division between trusted and
untrusted does not get intermingled, for it could lead to attacks such as XSS (See
4.3.5).
4.3.2 Common security problems
Arising from the same technologies used, different web applications have shared the
same vulnerabilities. Although these vulnerabilities are not the only ones found
in web applications, they still represent the lowest hanging fruits for attackers and
therefore warrant special attention. A few of these low hanging fruits are introduced
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here and more can be found in top lists by OWASP [vdSWW07] and CWE [Chr09].
4.3.3 Buffer overflow
Buffer overflow is the old champion the of CWE yearly vulnerability charts: it
held the first spot for years before web application specific vulnerabilities took over.
Buffer overflow bugs have made possible many Internet worms such as Morris Worm
and SQL Slammer that both had great a effect on the Internet. Buffer overflows can
exist in programs created at least partly using languages that are not memory-safe.
There is a large variety of different types of buffer overflows but the most archetypal
one is the stack-based buffer overflow bug seen in Listing 5.
Listing 5: stack-based buffer overflow
void o f l ow (char ∗ input ) {
char buf [ 2 5 6 ] ;
char ∗ s t a r t = buf ;
while (∗ input ){∗ s t a r t++ = ∗ input++;}
/∗ Do something wi th bu f ∗/
}
Buffer overflows vulnerabilities can either lead to data-corruption and crashing of
the process of thread running the code or to remote execution vulnerability. The
latter is clearly more significant problem as it can allow the attacker to take over
the whole computer running the web application meaning loss of confidentiality,
integrity and availability while the former just causes loss of availability.
The problem with buffer overflows is that even though a memory-safe language
might be used, its runtime and some, particularly I/O- and computationally heavy
libraries, are most probably programmed in a memory-unsafe language such as
C/C++.
Buffer overflows are best avoided by using constructs that prevent them: more
sophisticated data structures than arrays or memory-safe languages. Barring these
possibilities, memory debuggers and good engineering guidelines are next choices.
4.3.4 SQL injection
SQL injection is another case where input from users is treated too gullibly. In this
case, the persistence tier is attacked as queries to databases are created dynamically
based on user input.
Listing 6: SQL injection
conn = pool . getConnect ion ( ) ;
S t r ing s q l = ” s e l e c t ∗ from user where username=’” +
username +” ’ AND password=’” + password + ” ’ ” ;
stmt = conn . createStatement ( ) ;
r s = stmt . executeQuery ( s q l ) ;
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Problem here is that username and password are based on user input and that the
creation of SQL statement is handled as a string concatenation without escaping the
concatenated parts to a form suitable for SQL. Depending how SQL query results
are handled, this can lead to various damages:
In authentication: setting username to “root --” reduces query to “select *
from user where username=’root’” and thus allows user to log in as a root
user. The trick is that “--” is SQL token meaning that rest of the line is
comments only and should be ignored for query purposes.
In output: setting both username and password to “1’ OR ’1’ = ’1” would re-
duce query to “select * from user where username=’1’ OR ’1’ = ’1’ AND
password=’1’ OR ’1’ = ’1’”. Here the first two conditionals, “username=’1’”
and “’1’ = ’1’ AND password=’1’” rarely hold but the last conditional “’1’
= ’1’” is always true, causing whole “user” table to be printed instead of one
user and corresponding password.
A good way to avoid SQL injection is to add an abstraction layer between SQL
statements and strings. This creates a single point that can take care of escaping
input strings and of prohibiting unwanted sub queries.
4.3.5 Cross-site scripting
Cross-site scripting [Rit07] is even more common than SQL injection and has lately
topped both the CVE and OWASP vulnerability charts. It is usually abbreviated
as XSS instead of CSS which is used by another web technology, cascading style
sheets.
In short, XSS means that an attacker gets JavaScript they wrote served to users of
some site which allows them usually do everything that those users could do. This
includes stealing personal information or changing the content of the page served.
XSS comes in three varieties: local [Kle05], reflected, and stored. In all these attacks,
web application displays JavaScript or HTML content from attacker’s input. In
stored attack attacker has successfully stored this data to web applications database
and in local or reflected attack this data comes from current request. For example,
suppose we have a following page in our JavaServer Pages web application:
Listing 7: JSP-page vulnerable to reflected cross-site scripting
<%@ page contentType=” text /html ; cha r s e t=UTF−8” language=” java ” %>
<html><head><t i t l e>XSS page !</ t i t l e></head>
<body>
<% String msg = reques t . getParameter ( ”msg” ) ;
out . wr i t e ( ” He l lo ” + msg);%>
</body>
</html>
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This piece of code is vulnerable to reflected XSS attack: suppose a user is tricked
to go to URI of http://example.com/?msg=%3Cscript%3Ealert%28%22test!%22%
29%3B%3C/script%3E. Just visiting this address would cause a JavaScript box
saying “test!” to appear as URI-escaped characters are unescaped to form string
<script>alert("test!");</script>. This may not seem dangerous but instead
of showing a greeting, the supplied JavaScript could have sent user’s session cookie
to some other address, allowing session hijacking or had the website belonged to a
newspaper, added a story about a company posting giant losses and thus manipu-
lated stock market.
Like SQL injection, XSS is fundamentally about output encoding: how user-supplied
data is written to database query in the case of SQL injection or in XSS case, how
user-supplied data is rendered to a web page, be the data from database or from a
request. A naive approach would be blacklisting of HTML elements and JavaScript
and better working solution is to create a white list of allowed HTML elements or
to require users to use a completely different markup language than HTML.
4.3.6 Cross-site request forgery
In Cross-site request forgery (CSRF or rarely XSRF) a user is logged in to a web
application and user’s user agent has a cookie to prove that. When this user visits
another website that site can make request on behalf of the user by JavaScript or bare
HTML tags. Let us assume that Alice is logged in to her banking web application,
located at http://bank.example.com. Now if this web application were vulnerable
to cross-site request forgeries, Mallory could craft a page shown in Listing 8 that
would make deposit from Alice’s account to Mallory’s.
Listing 8: Different forged cross-site requests
<html><head><t i t l e>Page c r e a t i n g CSRFs !</ t i t l e></head>
<body>
< !−− Using GET −−>
<img src=” http :// bank . example . com/ depos i t ? from=a l i c e
&to=mal lory&amount=10000”>
< !−− Using POST −−>
<script>
var xmlhttp=new XMLHttpRequest ( ) ;
xmlhttp . open ( ”POST” , ’ http :// bank . example . com/ depos i t ’ , t rue ) ;
xmlhttp . send ( ’ from=a l i c e&to=mal lory&amount =10000 ’) ;
</ script>
</body>
</html>
This works for one simple reason: every time a request is done to a website that
browser still has valid cookie for, that cookie is send with the request. website
receiving the request has no way on knowing whether user intended the request or
whether it was initiated automatically by user’s browser because of some other web
site. This is a case of confused deputy problem (Section 3.1.3): requests originating
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from the web pages a user visits are made with the same level of authority as the
user’s explicit requests because the browser always sends the user’s cookie to the
website.
Where XSS exploits the trust users have on the web application, CSRF exploits the
trust the web application has on the user. Therefore web application needs to be
sure that requests are made by the user.
Adding an unforgeable token to each web page that then needs to be submitted
back to server with each request is an adequate control to prevent CSRF. This
unforgeable token might be a large random number from cryptographically secure
random number generator or the user’s cookie, both can be embedded within the
requests to prove authority.
Yet these controls are not enough to prevent another closely related problem dis-
covered in 2008, clickjacking.
4.3.7 Clickjacking
The main idea of clickjacking is to fool user into clicking buttons resulting different
actions than what user expects. Consider a case where Alice is authorized to edit
users’ access rights in a certain web application, called “foo”, and the steps required
for edit are:
1. Click on the user to edit.
2. Click what rights to give the user, read, all or admin.
3. Click “save” button.
Now Mallory sets up a web page that contains this “foo” in an iframe meaning that
page from “foo” is served within Mallory’s page. Mallory can then arrange her page
so that it covers page from “foo” and creates fake buttons for Alice to click. Clicks
from these fake buttons are then submitted to “foo” and with properly set up page,
Mallory can trick Alice to give her admin rights.
Protecting against clickjacking is best done by ensuring that the web application
cannot be included in an iframe. Shortest way to do this is to include JavaScript
snippet from Listing 9 to all pages web application serves.
Listing 9: JavaScript for breaking out of frames
<s c r i p t>
i f ( top != s e l f ) {
top . l o c a t i o n . h r e f=s e l f . l o c a t i o n . h r e f
}
</s c r i p t>
This solution will not work if JavaScript setters, the functions that are called when
some JavaScript objects value is set, are redefined as top.location.href=<value>
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may not do what is intended. A more reliable way is to add an onclick function to
all web application’s buttons that is run every time a button is clicked and denies
the request made by the click if the button is within an iframe.
As these both are a bit cumbersome and do not work when JavaScript is disabled,
browsers may need to come up with some protections of their own to solve the
problem.
4.3.8 Additional information
More information on these and other vulnerabilities can be found in Common Weak-
ness Enumeration (CWE), a strategic software assurance initiative sponsored by U.S.
Department of Homeland Security and run by MITRE Corporation [Mar07]. It clas-
sifies and categorizes vulnerabilities in software. CWE site has these categorizations
available for everyone to use with details explaining exploiting potential, examples of
the weakness, potential mitigations, and applicable platforms among others. CWE
also lists observed examples (actual vulnerabilities found in software) and links to
corresponding CVE (Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures) listing giving more
info on that specific vulnerability.
4.4 Conclusion
This section described technologies used to build modern web applications. HTTP
and HTTPS constitute the transport layer used to transfer data of web applica-
tions. HTML, JavaScript, DOM and XMLHttprequest are the tools for building
such applications. As the tools used to built the applications are common to all web
applications, the web applications often share same types of vulnerabilities.
Armed with knowledge of information security, security assessment methods and
web applications, we are ready to launch our case study. This case study will assess
and enhance security of a one mature web application.
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Part II
Efecte - a case study
5 Analysis of the Current Efecte System
Now that both information security with all its concepts and models and web tech-
nologies are all well understood it is time to put them to good use. This section will
introduce object of the case study, a mature web application called Efecte. Such a
mature application provides excellent grounds for assessing security but implement-
ing new security feature will be harder than earlier in the development.
After a short introduction to Efecte as a company and a product, an overview of
Efecte web application is presented. Latter half of this section assesses Efecte’s
security.
5.1 Overview of Efecte as a product and a company.
Efecte is an enterprise resource planning (ERP) solution for IT-departments devel-
oped and marketed by a Finnish company Efecte Corporation. As both company
and the product have the same name, using just Efecte without qualifiers will from
now on refer to Efecte the product. Efecte is implemented using Java and Java-
specific web technologies such as Servlets and JavaServer pages (JSP).
At its core, Efecte uses dynamic object model [RTJ00] that makes it feasible to
quickly adapt Efecte to customers’ needs and requirements of modeling their IT
domain. This modeling can be done by domain experts without the need of software
developers. This allows the developers to do their normal development instead of
customization.
Without digressing further to the dynamic object model, its upsides include fast and
easy modeling of domains but it has a few major downsides: it is quite rare pattern
but very pervasive in applications using it and it carries a performance penalty
because of additional indirection.
This pervasiveness is worse from developers perspective as it hinders the use of
many libraries that use Java’s normal object model in their modeling. Additionally,
as this pattern is quite rare, there are not many libraries, especially security ones,
supporting such modeling directly.
As a consequence, Efecte developers have had to develop many of the security fea-
tures by themselves. Such features are not as widely used and tested as the ones
provided by more commonly used libraries. Thus this work to assess and improve
Efecte’s current security.
So far, security work done on Efecte has been quite ad-hoc, based on problems found
by developers themselves or in black box security analyses. Efecte has been subjected
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to such analyses multiple times. These analyses have been quite superficial and
mostly brought up weaknesses and vulnerabilities that were known in advance. This
superficiality of black box testing comes as no surprise as no analysis on architecture
and comprehensive security solutions can be made. This work will continue onwards
from those black box testings and do a more comprehensive analysis on Efecte with
the help of access to both source-code and architecture descriptions. Especially
the latter is important as architectural weaknesses are responsible for half of the
vulnerabilities according to McGraw[McG06].
Before a proper analysis can be done, Efecte’s current state and architecture need
charting and introduction.
5.1.1 The Efecte data model
Efecte is mostly used to model computers, networks and the software connected to
those and yet the data model underneath knows nothing of such concepts. As stated
earlier, Efecte uses an dynamic object model close to the one described by Riehle et
al. [RTJ00] where key concepts are data cards, templates, classes, attributes, meta-
data and handlers. Compared to static object-oriented model used in Java or in
C++, data cards correspond to instances of different classes, known as templates
in Efecte and those classes contain instance variables that corresponding to Efecte’s
attributes. Efecte classes do not map directly to Java or C++ concepts and the clos-
est thing matching may be traits [BDNW07] that originally only brought behavior,
that is, methods, but have later been extended to contain also instance variables.
As seen in Figure 12, one or more attributes are grouped together to form a class;
one or more classes are grouped together to form a template and those templates
are then instantiated to data cards.
So far this may seem as a cumbersome way to model a static IT domain. Part of this
intricacy comes from the fact that although Efecte is marketed as an ERP solution
for IT, it is used in other domains such as contract management and the modeling
tools need to be usable in those domains as well.
The other part comes from the fact that Efecte only springs to life with usage of
Handlers and Listeners. Handlers specify actions that are taken when attributes
are modified and listeners specify actions that are taken when the whole data card is
saved. These two are then used by domain experts to create business rules [Ros03],
rules that specify constraints, derivations and facts concerning entities that are
significant enough for customer to be modeled in Efecte.
Setting up these rules is tasked to domain experts who model the customer’s system
at the deployment phase. This setup is done in Efecte using a web browser.
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Figure 12: Efecte system contains data cards that are instances of templates that
themselves consist of groups (consisting of attributes).
5.2 Efecte Web Application
Efecte has been in development since 1999 and during this time the landscape of
web technologies has changed drastically. The most significant changes have been
the introduction of Ajax (Section 4.2.3) and renewed interest by browser developers
on adhering to the web standards. The first one allowed easy sending and receiving
data from the web server without reloading pages and thus allowed more dynamic
web applications and the second one reduced web developers’ work required for
supporting different browsers.
Being developed incrementally without any complete rewrite, Efecte is an example
of this history: new technologies were adopted after they had been proven suitable
elsewhere and new features were developed using those new technologies, however
old features rarely were rewritten using the newer technology.
The user interface of Efecte consists of three types of web pages: static pages,
dynamic pages created by JSP and dynamic pages created by IT Mill Toolkit, a third
party toolkit for creating Ajax interfaces. Only the dynamic pages are interesting
from security point of view.
Mapping of different requests to Efecte is done using servlet mapping (Figure 13),
where patterns such as /efecte/* maps all requests that match that pattern to
a specific servlet. Servlets in Efecte’s case then map to different front ends: one
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Figure 13: Processing of one request in Efecte.
for normal Efecte, one for web-based integration and a few for different IT Mill
toolkit-based applications.
5.2.1 JavaServer Pages in Efecte
JavaServer pages is a Java technology developed by Sun Microsystems. It is a
template engine that allows intermixing of HTML with JSP tags in a “JSP file”
that it then turns into HTML. Adding a tag into a JSP file causes actions defined
in the Java code that the tag is an abstraction of. These actions usually consist of
creation of HTML based on parameters given to the tag or on the HTTP request
or both. In principle, all development of JSP files should use only HTML and these
tags with developers creating new tags to support new features.
In practice, many JSP files also contain Java code within special JSP tags that allow
writing of inline Java code. This inline Java is written when creating a new JSP
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tag is seen to cumbersome for the problem in hand but often the same code gets
written again and again in some other JSP files without creation of a JSP tag to
replace them all.
After normal Efecte gets an request, a controller is invoked to select what JSP or
Java class should then be called to create a response. Controller selects the JSP or
Java class based on a XML configuration file and if a suitable mapping is found based
on the request, invokes it (“Dispatch on actionmapping” in Figure 13), otherwise
generating an error page.
The invoked Java classes and JSP files are called actions. The actions present some
semantic action such as “send mail to this address” and to carry out the action, call
other code in Efecte, retrieve and modify data, etc (Business layer in Figure 13).
All parameters of the HTTP request are available for the action in an object called
“request” that can also be used to save data to. After dispatch to action is complete,
controller looks up if there is a result page to show. This result page then gives user
feedback of her request (“mail was send successfully”) and is dynamically created
from a JSP using data the action earlier has saved in the request.
All actions are not supposed to be used by all users. Actions such as displaying Efecte
log files or showing connected users are available only to Efecte administrators, a
condition checked at the start of an Action.
5.2.2 IT Mill toolkit
IT Mill toolkit is an open-source web application framework based on the popular
Google Widget Toolkit (GWT). IT Mill toolkit, henceforth only “the toolkit”, is a
framework that allows developers to build dynamic web applications using only Java,
with the toolkit taking care of dynamic creation of JavaScript and HTML. Toolkit
offers the same approach to graphical user interface (GUI) creation as desktop GUI
toolkits: it is event-driven with centralized event-queue and offers ready-made wid-
gets for composing displayed components such as windows and buttons.
Two main benefits offered by the toolkit are these ready-made widgets and the
toolkit’s security features. The security benefits the toolkit offers are two-fold; the
toolkit validates all actions on the server, preventing users from tampering with the
data and toolkit offers a centralized place for protections against attacks such as
XSS and CSRF.
Summary
Efecte uses two different technologies for generating its user interface. Although IT
Mill toolkit is poised to replace JSP-based part of Efecte, the work on this area has
not progressed very fast. This means that for the time being, all security issues need
to be considered in these two scenarios.
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5.2.3 Deployment
In addition to the Efecte web application part, an installed Efecte system consists of
a database and usually of a device information source. Currently the only supported
database is Microsoft’s SQL Server. For device information, Efecte supports out-
of-the-box Discovery, a tool by Centennial software to track computers and other
network devices, or Inspector, an in-house software for the same purpose.
All Efecte instances are deployed in the customer’s intranet and connected to various
services offered there, (e.g. directory service for users) as shown in Figure 14. It is
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Figure 14: Deployment of an Efecte system.
noteworthy that no traffic of Efecte system, save the traffic between workstations
and network inventory servers (Centennial or Inspector), is encrypted by default as
intranet is assumed to be trustworthy.
Assumption 1 No one untrustworthy can read or alter messages in the network
Efecte is installed in.
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Deployment as such consists of installing Efecte, installing device inventory server
and of configuration of Efecte and possible integrations to other systems. In the first
step, Efecte installer copies an application server called Resin, a Java runtime and
Efecte the web application to the server that is used to run Efecte. The installer also
sets up the database used to store Efecte data and configures Resin the application
server to run as a Windows service so it is automatically restarted in a case of a
crash.
Installing the inventory server is very straightforward and the nature of the ser-
vice does not leave room for many vulnerabilities. The only observed oddity was
that both Efecte and Inspector agents are installed to run with too large privileges
compared to privileges required, discussed further in Section 6.6.
The last step is the configuration of Efecte and its integration with other services.
Configuration of Efecte means both mapping users IT domain to Efecte and set-
ting permissions. Integration with other services means selecting services that are
used to import data to Efecte or that Efecte exports data to and defining required
conversions. Greatest concerns here are wrong or misbehaving services and ad-hoc
Jython scripts written by consultants doing the deployment.
The data the other services import to Efecte is trusted and thus can cause integrity
problems as the data only verified to have a proper structure. Jython scripts are
used to implement a customer specific needs not realizable through normal means
(handlers and listeners) but their power (scripts are trusted code) combined with
lack of security awareness can lead to vulnerabilities.
Efecte the company tries to assure correct installation and configuration of every
Efecte system deployment by training the consultants who perform the installation
and configuration: whenever the the installation process is changed, training sessions
are held and support material is updated.
5.3 Efecte access control
5.3.1 Authentication
Efecte stores state of the application in the server. When user’s browser connects
to Efecte, Efecte first sends it a cookie named JSESSIONID identifying the session
Efecte has created, and forwards the browser to the login page for authentication.
Efecte has been deployed in many different environments with different authen-
tication requirements. This has led to development of authentication framework
supporting different authentication methods through different classes implementing
PluggableAuthenticator interface as shown in Figure 15. Most commonly, user is
authenticated by a typed password or by NTLM authentication in case of Windows
users. Authenticated user is then bound to session and later identified from a session
cookie the user’s browser sends. Efecte’s security is based on the assumption that
only the user (or her browser) and server can know the value of the session cookie.
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Figure 15: Efecte’s authentication delegation from Login to actual authenticator.
Assumption 2 User’s JSESSIONID is only known to the user and Efecte.
Such assumption is justified as long as traffic in the network cannot be snooped
(Assumption 1) and user’s cookie cannot be divulged through some other means
such as through XSS vulnerabilities (Section 4.3.5) or by predicting its value.
5.3.2 Authorization
In brief, Efecte access control model is quite near that of role-based access control
model (discussed in Section 3.2.5), augmented with trusted procedures such as the
ones found in Clark-Wilson model and Biba’s model with ring property (Sections
3.2.4 and 3.2.3 respectively).
Permissions in Efecte are divided in three different groups: product permissions,
administrative permissions and data card permissions. All authorization in Efecte
is done for (user, action) tuple, with each user belonging to zero or more roles and
action depending on permission group. In this role-based access control model, each
role has a tuple of permissions containing all product, administrative and data card
permissions:
P = (Pdatacards, Pproducts, Padmin), where
Pdatacards = (Ptemplates, Pfolders, Pattributes)
Table 5 lists what types of permissions each permission group contains. Effective
permissions in each of the permission groups are union of permissions of each of the
roles the user has.
The most straightforward of the permission groups are data card permissions that
work quite like file and directory permissions in operating systems.
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Table 5: Different permission groups in Efecte
Permission group possible modes targets
Product permissions read ⊕ write ⊕ none different products
Efecte Web API
Administrative permissions true⊕ false
edit users
edit static values
edit templates
edit folders
import data cards
Data card permissions create | read | update | delete
templates
folders
attributes
Data card permissions group contains four different permissions types of access
permission - “read”, “write”, “update” and “delete” - that correspond to so-called
“CRUD”-operations [Kil90] of database-level. Efecte does not allow blind writes,
updates or deletes so having permission to any of these operations also gives permis-
sion to read the data card. Access control is resolved on sub data card granularity:
access to a data card is based on Ptemplates but access to different attributes that the
data cards consists of is based on Pattributes. So user in one role may be able to see
and edit parts of a data card that are not shown to some users in another role.
Still, this level of granularity is not enough in situations where each user would need
some individual permissions. For example, each help desk employee has her own set
of cases assigned to her and she needs to be able to write on those so that she can
close the cases and her progress can be tracked. Yet we cannot give her write access
to all help desk cases as that would create integrity problems. The solution is to
grant discretionary access to the user.
This problem could be solved in two ways: either within the role-based access control
model, adding each user a unique personal “role” with permissions specific only to
this user or outside it by adding another mechanism to gain permissions in addition
to roles. In Efecte, the latter route was taken and the finer-grained permissions are
implemented using Elevated User Permissions or EUPs for short that allow giving
users more permissions to a certain card, such as these help desk cards. EUPs
included, the effective permissions a user has on arbitrary data card D are given by
P (D) = Pelevated(D) ∪ Prole1(D) · · · ∪ Prolen(D).
Product permissions either deny all permissions or give permission to view (“read”)
or fully use (“write”) some parts of Efecte system. Product permissions limit data
card permissions as a user can only access data cards that are created from templates
residing in products the user can access.
Administrative permissions is the other interesting group of permissions. All
administrative permissions are constrained by data card permissions and product
permissions: if a user cannot access a data card or folder, the user cannot edit it
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either.
Edit users allows editing of users if editing of the user data card is allowed other-
wise: a user with “edit users”-permission can edit other users only if the user
can edit the folder the user data cards reside in.
Edit templates grants permission to create, update and delete templates and at-
tributes’ and templates’ permissions in products user has access to.
Edit static values allows a user to edit all static values. Access to static values is
not constrained by other permissions.
Edit folders grants permission to edit folders user can read beforehand, allowing
the user set what templates are allowed in a folder and what access rights roles
have to folders.
Import data cards grants permission to import data cards to Efecte, to update
old cards and to create new cards.
In addition to these access controls, each user is designated on one of three user
levels: read-only, normal or root. When user level is set to normal user, all access
controls work as described before. With read-only level, all permissions to modify
(create, update, delete) are revoked and with root level, all access control checks are
by-passed.
Like most settings in Efecte, users and roles are first created during the deployment
phase. Customers can then later add new new users and roles by themselves but
this is not done constantly so it is safe to assume that permissions are configured in
line with company’s security policy.
Assumption 3 All roles and users have properly configured access rights.
5.4 Approach
As a 2001 workshop on information assurance found that no single metric can give
an objective picture of the trustworthiness of a system [VHS03], we will use multiple
metrics to evaluate Efecte’s security. Our approach to evaluating Efecte’s security
consists of following steps:
1. List and analyze threats and risks affecting Efecte.
2. Get familiar with Efecte’s architecture and do architectural risk analysis, as
in Section 3.4.2.
3. Analyze Efecte’s data flow in the spirit of attack surface measurement, as in
Section 3.4.3, but without comparisons.
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4. Do white-box code review and penetration testing on the code directly exposed
to attackers.
5. Repeat phases 2 - 4 to most important third party components, as thoroughly
at possible.
It needs to be noted that problem here is the same as in all software testing, namely
that these methods can only be used to find defects but not to show lack of them;
to give assurance but not proof of security.
5.5 Threats and risks
First thing done was an enumeration and analysis on threats against Efecte and
their effect on different customers. As noted earlier, Efecte is predominantly used to
model IT domain in different companies, but because of the dynamic object model
used use of Efecte is not limited only to that domain. Analyzing threats common to
all customers is impossible without knowing each customer’s current use cases and
deployment situation, which we lack. Therefore this analysis is necessarily based on
our recommended deployment pattern described in 5.2 and on the most common
use cases.
Based on this, we define our exemplar customer as follows: IT-department of a
company, running Efecte on Windows platform with a few dozen simultaneous users.
Such a customer uses Efecte to maintain its IT infrastructure and possibly other
things such as contract stock. From these assumptions we can derive following
assumptions on Efecte and its deployment.
1. Efecte is installed in customer’s intranet and is reachable only within this
network.
2. Efecte contains data that is valuable but not critical to customer. Loss of
confidentiality is not as bad as loss of integrity and availability.
3. In case of outsider attack, Efecte will be the first target only if it will make
other attacks easier.
4. Customers use Efecte in a supported environment.
First assumption means that Efecte is partly protected through physical security and
in case this physical security is breached, second assumption says that the customer
will suffer greater loss from compromise of other assets. Third assumption is tied
to the second: Efecte will not be primary target of attacks as it will not contain as
valuable information as customer’s other systems but it can still be first target if
attacking Efecte will help with attacking primary targets.
Earlier, Efecte was installed in dozens of different environments but since 2008 there
has been a policy in effect concerning environments Efecte should be installed to
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and what browsers are supported. Currently, supported installation environments
are Windows Server 2003 and 2008 and of browsers, Internet Explorer 7 and Mozilla
Firefox 3 are supported. Supporting only a few browsers makes security evaluation
easier given how much browsers differ on small details (for a throughout study,
see [Zal09]) and does not restrict possible users significantly as those two browsers
currently have most of the market share.
Having Efecte only in intranet leaves two possible groups of attackers: insiders and
determined outsiders leaving out casual outsiders that target sites in the Internet.
This combined with assumptions on Efecte usage mean that attacks that make it
possible for outsiders to reach Efecte and attacks that cause loss of integrity and
confidentiality are the most severe types. Even though availability was valued in
the assumptions about Efecte usage, availability attacks from the insiders are easier
to detect and stop than attacks on confidentiality and integrity.
Based on these assumptions, we first generated and analyzed threats based on pos-
sible attacks with attack trees. These attacks were the substantiated with archi-
tectural risk analysis that brought up our dependency on some core third party
components (discussed further in Sections 6.2 and 6.4).
5.5.1 Attack trees
To generate and concretize threats, attack trees were employed. However, results
of the attack tree analysis are not published here. Publishing the results could
give possible attackers information on what angles of attack have possibly been left
uncovered and reap virtually no benefits. Instead, problems encountered in creating
attack trees are described.
Creation of attack trees was not easy. Largest obstacle in generating attack trees
was that the lack of control on deployment environment. Even though an ideal
environment for security analysis was defined, it was not controlled enough to allow
precise estimation of what attacks are possible and how possible they are. Especially
hard was coming up with a realistic goal as Efecte’s usage and data stored there
varies. Only goal we used was “get access to data in Efecte”, whereas actual attackers
goals will vary depending on the organizations attacked.
A better way to employ attack trees would be to do a security analysis at each
deployment environment and see what would attacker’s goals be there. If attack
tree analysis would then show that viewing information only available in Efecte
were attacker’s goal, customer and Efecte could make defensive preparations in
Efecte deployment and the environment it is deployed in.
Nevertheless, attack tree analysis had some benefits: it pinpointed areas in Efecte
where Efecte is most vulnerable and made explicit the assumptions on which Efecte’s
security is built.
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5.5.2 Architectural risk analysis
Architectural risk analysis (Section 3.4.2) starts with a creation of high-level view
of the system. Since there was no single document giving a one-page view of the
system, creation of the view was considered. As this analysis was done with the chief
architect of Efecte, such a documentation was ruled as unnecessary, based on the
fact that all information was readily available through questioning and documents
describing architecture partially.
With hindsight, this was wrong decision. Although the information was freely avail-
able, its processing was harder than what would’ve been with a good one-page
picture. This may be the most important cause why some of the process’ parts did
not seem to work out.
First part of the process, attack resistance analysis, yielded a few results. As a
result of missing the one-page picture, some parts of the system might have been
overlooked. As there was little information of historical risks, most of the process
was abuse case analysis: enumerating different parts of the system and thinking how
they could be abused. As my experience on abusing systems was quite limited, usage
of weakness and vulnerability listings such as OWASP top 10 Java EE vulnerabilities
and especially CWE list of most dangerous programming errors were a great help.
Second part of the process, ambiguity analysis, was still harder. McGraw states:
“This process, by definition, requires at least two analysts (the more the merrier)
and some amount of experience”. As noted earlier, the whole architectural risk
analysis — as probably all risk analysis — requires experienced analysts and there
were none available.
Ambiguity analysis was done in a quite ad-hoc manner with reading parts of code and
documentation to get an idea how the system supposedly works and then questioning
chief architect on how this part was supposed to work. The analysis brought up parts
of the system that seemed error-prone but did not uncover any new weaknesses.
Proneness to error was almost always result of needlessly complex implementation
of control mechanisms.
Last part of the process, weakness analysis was the most painless part. Weakness
analysis tries to assess what trusted parts of the system could contain weaknesses
and how this misplaced trust would affect the whole system. Efecte rests on quite
a large stack of software:
1. On third party libraries and frameworks. Most of the libraries are used only
for a small part but then a few pervasive frameworks touch many levels of
Efecte.
2. On Java application server. Currently supported application server is Resin
from Caucho Technology inc. but some customers run their own application
servers.
3. On SQL database server. As seen in Figure 13, all integrity of Efecte’s data is
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based on database’s integrity. Efecte currently supports only Microsoft SQL
Server.
4. On Java virtual machine (JVM). Although some customers run Efecte on other
JVMs, our current supported JVM is Sun’s release 6.
5. On the operating system running all preceding software. Operating system is
some version of Windows, most often Windows 2003 server.
Of this stack of software trusted, it is customers task to keep their operating system
and database server secure. They are “blindly” trusted, meaning that we will not
take their impact on security into account as we cannot do much on them. This
left application server, Java virtual machine and third party libraries still to be
considered.
Any security problems in JVM and application server would clearly cause problems
also in Efecte if the problem was not strictly bound to local access only. With
libraries the results were not as clear for usage and pervasiveness of the libraries
varied greatly. Guidelines adopted for estimating libraries’ importance were to check
in how many files this library was used and to check was the library used directly
(“call a function and get results”) or indirectly (“set up environment for the library
to work”). Frameworks work in this indirect way and touch many more parts than
a library for drawing charts and are thus “trusted” more than normal libraries.
This analysis both clarified relative importance of different third party components
and made it clear that some tool to track problems in third party components was
needed. Although security companies such as Secunia offer services for tracking
third party vulnerabilities, we decided to implement a simple tracking tool just get
started with following these vulnerabilities. This tool is described in Section 6.2.
5.6 Vulnerability analysis
To find vulnerabilities and places that might be vulnerable, Efecte’s attack surface
was first measured and then code on that surface was reviewed and penetration
tested. These phases were then repeated in smaller scale for two important third
party components of Efecte: Resin application server and IT Mill’s GUI toolkit.
5.6.1 Attack surface analysis
Attack surface measurement, described in Section 3.4.3, is a metric meant for com-
parison of two or more pieces of software. As we are not interested in comparing
Efecte’s security to some competitor’s product, we adapt only the general idea of
assessing security through system’s simplicity and through the surface exposed to
attackers.
The first few articles on attack surface measurement by Howard et al. [HPW03]
and by Manadhata et al. [MTMW07] concentrated on measuring attack surface of
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different program written in C which made them a bit less useful given that Efecte
is written mostly in Java. Manadhata et al. had, however, also later applied their
methods to Java-based software at SAP AG [MKW08]. Based on these articles,
measuring attack surface of a system was easy in principle:
1. Generate call graph for the whole system.
2. Identify entry and exit points based on the call graph and I/O-operations used
in calls.
3. Assign damage potential-effort ratios.
First problem encountered was that the tool used by Manadhata et al. to generate
call graphs, TACLE, did not support newer versions of Java. This led to research
for other call graph generators but none of the tested were suitable for use. Hence
the idea to use call graphs was discarded and instead potential entry and exit points
were found by hand. Manual attack surface analysis has the downsides of not being
easily repeatable and possibly missing some parts of the surface. Consequentially,
state of call graph generating tools should be checked frequently to see if any tool
would allow easy creation of attack surface measuring tool.
Inspection of code and architectural documents (such as deployment diagram in
Figure 14) revealed that Efecte receives data from four main sources: from HTML-
forms, from web services, from data imports and from its database and mail. Database
is seen as a part of the system and thus considered trusted. Import being an opera-
tion requiring special administrative privileges (Section 5.3.2), this left two sources
that can be used by most of the users and one source that can only be used by the
selected few allowed to do imports.
Information flows out of Efecte to three destinations: to web pages shown to users,
to database and to other systems in case of integration interfaces such as XML
export and JMS messages. As Efecte’s state ultimately resides in the database, all
writes to it need special attention.
Based on these observations, we started to trawl through all potential entry and exit
points. Points were quickly classified to three informal classes, “trivial”; “normal”
and “fishy”, with “normal” being code that did not seem too complex and “fishy”
was tangled code that looked hard to understand and therefore, perhaps, hard to
get right. “Fishy”-class also contained points where standard abstractions Efecte
provides for handling database or HTML generation were not used signifying special
circumstances and special chance to make mistakes. If code seemed to handle files,
an extra note was added to remind of checking the code better later as handling of
files is a common source of vulnerabilities.
Classification and checking if entry- or exit-point wrote data somewhere else than
to the immediate response constituted the damage potential rating. There were
three effort levels, based on how easy the functionality was to find without source
code: “easy” meaning all users can see it, “medium” meaning that only Efecte
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administrators can see the functionality and “hard” meaning that even though the
functionality was available, it was not used anywhere. Entries in last category are
discussed more in Section 6.1.
This list of entry and exit points together with assigned damage potential-effort
ratios shows where vulnerabilities would have the greatest impact and can be used
to prioritize both reviews and mitigation efforts. The review part is taken to extreme
in the next step, penetration testing, where risky parts of the system are exposed
to attacks.
5.6.2 White-box Penetration testing
Whereas functional testing is “testing for positives”, testing that some functionality
exists and works properly, penetration testing [Bis07] is “testing for negatives”.
Problem with testing for negatives is that there are virtually infinite ways for system
to fail and only limited ways to succeed. All security testing tries to create assurance
so that we can be assured that system’s security is precise, allowing only all secure
states and not broad.
So, question of whether penetration testing should be done at all is a valid question.
McGraw lists common critique on penetration testing [McG06]:
• Penetration testing is done just to allow managers say security issues have
been handled.
• Penetration testing represents a too late approach to security as when done
late, fundamental problems found are very expensive to fix at that stage. This
leads to quick band-aiding over symptoms instead of removing the cause.
• Penetration testing is usually done by an overzealous information security
team not connected to normal developers, resulting both sides getting angry
as developers think security team reports insignificant problems and security
team thinks developers do not take their reports seriously.
All these points may be valid in some environments but in the case of Efecte, only
the second point might be true. One important tenet of penetration testing, that
our testing slightly violated, is that it happens in the deployment environment so
problems rising from the environment and configuration can be found. The violation
in our approach was to test on developer’s machine instead of setting up a separate
computer to penetrate.
Results of this violation are threefold: finding of configuration problems is limited
and network-dependent problems cannot be found at all, but finding other problems
is faster as program execution can be followed better with debugger and other devel-
oper tools. As Efecte is configured individually for every customer, we can only find
problem rising from the basic configuration that is used as the basis of customer’s
configuration. This is the same configuration that we can test; what we cannot test
is interplay of basic configuration and customized configurations.
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Inability to find network dependent problems is not a great loss as such problems
were known up front (see Section 6.3). Upside of allowing trace execution paths
with debugger more than made up for the downsides. If a penetration attempt
“almost succeeded” meaning that it was only blocked by a control at some final
stage, debugger allowed us to see if this control would block other attempts too or
would the attack succeed, speeding up the testing.
After penetration testing for the list from attack surface analysis was done, all
uncovered vulnerabilities were given a severity estimate. The estimating method
was inspired by common vulnerability scoring system [MSR+07] that is used to
score vulnerabilities in mass-marketed software. We discarded the temporal and
environmental dimensions from the scoring and only focused on the base metrics:
what does the vulnerability mean for Efecte. Our scoring included five factors:
impact on confidentiality, on integrity and on availability, required level of access to
Efecte and an estimate of how easy the vulnerability is to find.
As it is not wise to rely on safety of the source for security, the last factor was used
only as a tie-breaker. White-box based penetration testing brought two benefits:
a list of prioritized weaknesses and assurance that other entry- and exit-points are
quite safe. This prioritized list can be further mined for similarities that can lead
to overlooked problems in architecture or problems in control implementations.
5.6.3 Significant third parties
There are two third party components in Efecte that constitute a significant amount
of Efecte’s attack surface: application server Resin and GUI toolkit IT Mill toolkit.
Resin
Resin is a Java application server from Caucho Technology used to run Efecte. Resin
comes in two versions, “Resin Open Source” released under GPLv2 license and com-
mercial “Resin professional” with latter version being used in Efecte installations.
With even the “Resin Open Source” consisting of 650,000 lines of Java source code
and of tens of thousands source code lines in other languages, nothing but a cursory
glance at the most probable sources of security problems was possible.
One such a source is generation of session identifiers. Tomcat, a competing ap-
plication server, has had multiple problems in its handling of session identifiers,
documented in various vulnerability advisories, and a session identifier generation
attack by Gutterman and Malkhi [GM05].
In their attack, Gutterman and Malkhi were able to decipher seed value used to
generate session identifiers one day of calculation. With seed value, all session
identifiers generated by Tomcat are known and new sessions created by other users
can be hijacked at leisure.
The attack works because instead of 160 bits SHA-1-based pseudorandom number
generator (PRNG) being unknown, only exact startup time of the server is unknown.
If the server were started within a day, this would give only 226 ms to find the
74
correct seed from and were the server started within a year, 235 milliseconds. Now
what attacker has to do is initialize the random number generator for each of the
milliseconds and generate random number until a session identifier that attacker has
retrieved from the server is returned (seed is found) or estimated maximum amount
of session identifiers the server could have generated is surpassed (incorrect seed).
Thus, there was a clear need to see if the session identifiers used by Resin could be
compromised in the same way. Source code inspection was done using “Resin Open
Source” source code which revealed that Resin uses a same method to generate
session identifiers as Tomcat except that Resin appends current time string to the
generated random number string to create the session identifier. Based on packages
included within “Resin professional”, it uses the same method for generating session
identifiers.
This all points to the direction that Resin is not as vulnerable as Tomcat. How hard
an attack on Resin is, remains to be seen as application of Gutterman and Malkhi
attack was postponed as there were more urgent problems found in Efecte.
IT Mill toolkit
IT Mill toolkit is framework for creating dynamic web applications using only Java.
As such it in as ideal tool for Efecte as it allowing developers to use their knowledge
of Java for development and outsource problems of multi-browser compatibilities to
the toolkit developers.
Two main threats were that the toolkit would have XSS or CSRF vulnerabilities.
Much of IT Mill user interface components are based on Google Web Toolkit (GWT)
and based on its popularity and Google’s testing practices, GWT was estimated to
be an unlikely source for vulnerabilities. Thus, vulnerabilities were only searched in
IT Mill’s custom components. To find vulnerabilities, source code of these custom
components was then scanned for code that either creates HTML dynamically or
uses JavaScript. No dubious components were found and as GWT has been used
extensively for three years, we chose to trust its XSS protection mechanisms.
Cross-site request forgeries are a different story: GWT does not directly protect
against CSRF. However, the toolkit includes its own CSRF protection where every
session has an additional, cryptographically secure, random number connected to it.
This random number is then submitted with each toolkit request to the server that
checks if it matches the value stored in session.
These protections means that Efecte Corporation can trust IT Mill toolkit not to
be a source of either of these vulnerabilities.
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6 Flaws and Solutions
Based on the approach taken in Section 5, this section will report some of the
problems found in Efecte security. Each problem will be first described, then if
needed, evaluated and lastly, mitigative actions and their possible implementation
are discussed.
6.1 Old testing code in production application
There were multiple cases where code that developers had written just for testing
purposes was found in production. As these pieces of code were not written security-
consciously, quite contrary as the pieces of code were supposed to help testing,
these pieces all contained vulnerabilities of varying severity. The pieces, having
laid dormant for years, were mostly found during the attack surface analysis and
white-box testing.
During the early years, Efecte did not have any clear process on how new features
were developed and shipped. Instead, one developer might have developed a feature
requested by a customer and if the developer was satisfied with the code, the code
was checked into version control and shipped to customers. This led to situations
where development code never intended to be included in a shipped application
nevertheless was included and to situations where the developer did not consider
how the developed feature would have affected Efecte’s security.
6.1.1 Mitigation: better process
Development methodology in Efecte has changed significantly since the early days.
Nowadays, there is a clear process for how the development is done. In this process
the whole development team “owns” the code and code review is done for all new
features and changes. This ownership of code means that there are fewer places in
code that are developed by just one developer, leading to fewer defects and vulner-
abilities because more eyes see every part of the code. All development happens in
separate branches of version control system and before this code is combined with
the main code line, there is a code review. This code review is done by a developer
who has not taken part in development of this specific feature or change so the
reviewer brings a pair of fresh eyes to the process and catches problems that have
evaded the developing team.
This process has virtually eliminated the possibility of including features not meant
for production in the shipped application. Furthermore, regular code reviews try to
assure that new features with questionable security do not get into code base.
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6.2 Vulnerabilities in third party components
As Efecte uses over forty different third party libraries, being aware of latests prob-
lems in code from those sources was cumbersome and was not done systematically.
This meant that when developers of these third party libraries announced their fixes
to vulnerabilities (disclosing the problem at the same time), it would often take
from days to weeks before this was noticed by Efecte developers. This would give
possible attackers time to use these disclosed vulnerabilities before Efecte code base
and customers using Efecte were upgraded to the fixed library version.
Although there have been no records of such attacks, during architectural risk analy-
sis (Sections 3.4.2 and 5.5.2) better tracking of third party component vulnerabilities
was deemed very important.
6.2.1 Mitigation: tracking third party bug reports
First the list of used third party libraries was brought up-to-date. Next we ac-
quainted ourselves with how development teams behind these libraries report their
bugs, vulnerabilities and solutions. Most of the libraries used are open-source and
happily many open-source teams use either Mozilla Bugzilla, Atlassian JIRA or
Sourceforge.net’s own tool as their bug tracking tool. All of these tools support
filtering of bugs and fixes by severity and additionally, Bugzilla and JIRA support
filtering by version which allowed creation of views containing only bugs in version
that interest us and that were severe enough. These views were then exported as
Bug tracker A
Bug tracker B
Bug tracker C
Combine feeds to 
create a new feed
Filter
Follow bug reports
subscribe
Filter
Filter
Figure 16: Simple third party vulnerability tracking
web feeds and the feeds were combined using a custom tool producing the final feed
that could be subscribed to (see Figure 16).
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For libraries that only publish changelogs or corresponding text items where changes
are announced, a partial solution is to implement custom parsing logic. Unfortu-
nately, not all libraries publish the security vulnerabilities they have fixed making
decision of when to move to a new version hard. Their reasoning is that users of the
old versions are thus protected from exploitation.
6.3 Unencrypted traffic
By default, Efecte and Inspector allow unencrypted or barely encrypted traffic.
This delegates final responsibility for all Efecte’s security to impenetrability of the
network in which Efecte is deployed. Even though companies often keep routing
equipment and switches in safe places, network still often succumb to other attack
such as ARP poisoning [Wha01, Zal05]. ARP poisoning allows an attacker to pretend
that she is Efecte, Efecte’s user or both, making session hijacking a triviality or even
worse, intercept traffic between Efecte and the database server.
A lesser problem is the very weak encryption used in Inspect. Inspector proxy, the
server gathering data from different computers, uses 512 bit RSA public key for the
handshake used to create 40 bit RC4 session key. RSA public key with length of 512
bits requires 8400 MIPS years [CLR+00] to factor and currently top-notch desktop
processor deliver 76000 MIPS meaning that one such processor would factor 512
bit RSA key in approximately forty days. Special hardware or multiple computers
could bring this cheaply within a day’s range.
Even more compromisingly, Biham and Carmeli have shown that 40 bit RC4 session
key can be broken in 0.02 seconds [BC08] using a single desktop computer. This
means that encryption used by Inspector is only a slight hindrance, not a protection
by any means even against an attacker without any special resources.
Thus, it is safe to assume that all traffic between Inspector and workstations is
listenable. Therefore either encryption used must be enhanced or it must be assumed
that no confidential information is passed between Inspector proxy and the scanned
device. The only information that can reasonable be expected to be confidential is
list of installed software (what the computer’s user and company do) and the list of
users that have logged into the system. Thus Efecte the company chose the latter
route, considering Inspector traffic non-confidential.
6.3.1 Evaluation
Traffic that is not strongly encrypted is susceptible to insider attacks and to outsiders
that have gained an entry to company’s network. Traffic in such network is snoopable
given one of the following weak assumptions: used network equipment does not
prevent ARP poisoning, static IP addresses are used instead of DHCP which disables
network equipments’ ARP poisoning prevention or physical snooping of the traffic
is possible either by using cables or wireless LAN.
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There are virtually no reasons for not using encryption. Given the possible attacks
the unencrypted traffic allows, combined with ease of turning encryption on, there
is only one choice of action.
6.3.2 Solution: enabling encryption
For the first problem, the solution is simple and straightforward. Efecte needs to
be configured to only accept HTTPS connections, instantly upgrading connections
from HTTP to HTTPS before allowing other traffic. To prevent spoofing with self-
signed certificate4, no self-signed certificates should be used with Efecte. In cases
when a self-signed certificate is used, such certificate should be delivered to users
beforehand so their browsers will warn if the certificate changes. Additionally, as
database holds the confidential material and admin password to Efecte, SSL needs
to be enabled on Efecte’s database driver.
Additional care should be taken to confirm that Efecte’s session identifiers are only
send with encrypted traffic to prevent attacks where browsers are tricked to make
unencrypted requests to Efecte.
As for the Inspector problem of very weak encryption, this is not usually a problem.
As Inspector just sends information about the installed hardware and software,
snooping such traffic is rarely a problem. However, if customers feel that their
traffic needs to be encrypted with a credible encryption, they are offered another
inventory tool called Discovery. Discovery supports 1024 bit RSA keys combined
with 128 bit Blowfish symmetric cipher, thus offering a significantly better level of
security.
6.4 Resin session id generation
Resin session identifier generation seems vulnerable to the same attack as Tomcat’s
session identifier generation (see Section 5.6.3). However, two mitigating factors are
present: Resin adds the time it receives a request to the generated random number
and reuses session identifiers.
Adding the time of the request to the generated random number adds more infor-
mation the attacker need to infer so the attacker needs to make regular connections
to Efecte to estimate the time when a new session identifier has been created for a
user.
If the user of Efecte still has a cookie in the browser (the browser has not been
shut down), the user’s browser sends it to Efecte when connecting to Efecte. Even
if the user’s session at Efecte has been closed, Resin reuses this cookie and the
session identifier it contains. This reuse of session identifier lessens the opportunities
4A certificate (Section 4.1.2) that is not signed by a commonly trusted certification authority.
Everyone can self-sign certificates and thus deliver public keys but this gives no assurance that
they key is from who it is purported to be from.
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available to the attacker and thus requires a longer period of active attack.
6.4.1 Evaluation
Attack seems feasible but would generate a noticeable amount of connections that
offer a slightly changed session identifiers. Were the attacker to check is Efecte had
issued a new session identifier every five seconds, the attacker still would need to
make at most 5 s ∗ 1 connection/ms = 5000 connections to the server in order to
find the correct time stamp. This would be noticeable, had Efecte a ’ detection
system to detect the attack.
Feasibility of the attack seems especially good when Efecte has just been started as
both the uncertainty about seed value and the amount of session identifiers generated
is low. Additionally, as the attack is not based on anything new, there is no reason
to believe that a determined attacker would not be able to come up with this attack
and test its functioning.
6.4.2 Mitigation ideas
The whole attack stems from the lack of real entropy source for pseudorandom
number generator. SHA-1 based PRNG has 160 bits of internal state but only some
part of it (220 to 236) is unknown to the attacker. Were Resin able to make the
inner state less predictable, for example by using operating system’s entropy pool,
the attack would be completely foiled. Even doubling the entropy contained (to
272) would make the attack infeasible. This is, however, something that Caucho
Technology, the developers of Resin, have to do. This possible vulnerability has
been reported to them.
A fix that could be implemented in Efecte would be to save sufficiently (say 10000)
large amount of last session identifiers offered and the hosts offering them. In case
a host offers enough non-existent session identifiers, an alarm could be issued to the
Efecte administrators. This fix assumes that attack would come from only a few
computers, a valid assumption in a corporate intranet.
6.5 Path traversal
Path traversal vulnerability is a subclass of vulnerabilities where a developer exposes
a reference to some object internal to the web application. In path traversal that
object is a some file or directory, as in the following example:
1. Path to a file is read from request.
2. A handle to the file is constructed based on this path.
3. An action is taken on the file.
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Often, there is a step between first and second called “improperly check input” where
the file is supposedly checked to be within some specific directory as in Listing 10.
Listing 10: Path traversal vulnerability
St r ing path = reques t . getParameter ( ” p a t h t o f i l e ” ) ;
i f ( path . s tartsWith ( ” good d i r e c t o ry ” ) ) {
F i l e f i l e = new F i l e ( path ) ;
//Do something wi th the f i l e
} else {
//Take ac t i on aga in s t a p o s s i b l e a t t a c k
}
While this approach of checking works against naive attacks such as setting request
parameters ‘path to file to c:\\windows\\secrets.txt it can be bypassed by
relative paths such as good directory\\..\\..\\windows\\secrets.txt.
6.5.1 Discovery
During attack surface analysis phase (Section 5.6.1), source code files that contained
entry and exit points handling both files and request data were marked for later
inspection. Giving a closer look to those files in white box penetration testing
(Section 5.6.2) bore fruit: three different files used the same utility for handling
references to files on the file system and this utility had a path traversal vulnerability.
This vulnerability was of the naiver kind; vulnerable code did not even check if
the path was supposedly within allowed directory but instead gave an unrestricted
access to any files on the system. Given that Resin normally runs as “local system”
user (Section 6.6), access to all files was guaranteed.
These flawed parts of Efecte allowed deleting and downloading of arbitrary files,
but only from the computer Efecte runs on. With all data residing in the database,
hopefully on another machine, confidentiality was not impacted but integrity and
availability were greatly compromised.
Explanation for this carelessness seemed to be that the request parameters were not
from any user selectable part of user interface and thus were not meant for users
to set. Instead, the parameters were used to pass information from one request to
another which had led developers writing the code ignore the security issues.
6.5.2 Solution: a unified file access interface
Files are handled in multiple places in Efecte source code, creating multiple possi-
bilities for failure.
The most secure solution would be to create an interface for handling files that
would allow easy restriction of paths and file operations and to restrict management
of files to only this trusted interface. Then, only one place of the code would need
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to be trusted and testing effort could be spent only in one place leading to better
testing and thus greater assurance of correct functioning would follow.
Unfortunately, this wide direct usage of files meant that there were plenty of places
where change from old direct handling to indirect handling could cause bugs. For
this reason, path traversal vulnerabilities were first fixed only in this one utility by
canonizing the path before checking whether access to the path was allowed or not.
6.6 Efecte’s extra privileges
Efecte, or more specifically Resin application server running Efecte, runs on a Win-
dows machine as “local system” user, the Windows version of super-user. What
Efecte actually needs is an ability to run a HTTP server on port 80 or 443 (for
encrypted traffic), write to directory it is installed to and to initiate a connection to
a database.
None of these operations need the vast access rights given to “local system” user in
Windows, a normal limited user would suffice. Giving too large access rights does
not create a vulnerability per se, but were Efecte to contain vulnerabilities affecting
the computer it is run on, proper access rights would dampen the impact.
Same kind of violation of principle of least privilege exist in relation between Efecte
and the database server: Efecte is given access rights of database administrator
even though Efecte’s normal function is just to write and read a small set of tables.
Database administrator is allowed to perform any action to any table in the database:
read, write and delete any table or its content.
Both of these weaknesses are consequences of making installation easy. Installing
the Resin HTTP server Windows service as something other than “local system”
would require creation of a limited user for Efecte use and installing the service
in that user’s name. Such an installation procedure would require modification of
current Efecte installer and writing custom code in the installer as currently used
installer builder does not support installation of services with a specific user, let
alone creation of such users.
When Efecte is installed, Efecte needs to create the tables it will use in the database.
This creation of tables is automated within the installer but requires database ad-
ministrator access rights and instead of giving separate user name and password for
installation and for normal usage, only one user name and password is used. Given
that running Efecte then uses these administrative access rights and that compa-
nies rarely have dedicated databases for Efecte, effect of a vulnerability that allows
access to database, such as SQL injection, is needlessly made more severe.
On top of these installer-based problems, the Inspector agent on workstations is run
with “local system” privileges. The Inspector agent is a self-written C++ software
that communicates through the network. There is a small chance of a buffer overflow
vulnerability and thus running as a “local system” should be avoided if possible.
For gathering most of the data and for listening to a port, the Inspector agent does
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not require any privileges that a normal user does not have. The Inspector agent
installation has the same problem as installing Resin HTTP server: it is easier to
install a service as a “local system” instead of creating a limited user for running
the agent.
6.6.1 Mitigation: reducing privileges
All these cases of too large privileges stem from the desire to make the installation
of Efecte and accompanying tools easier. None of the described programs need to
run with as large privileges as they are currently granted but circumstances force
the situation. Although there are some claims that principle of least privilege is
fundamentally wrong [Ber07], it is widely considered a good principle for reducing
damages if not actual vulnerability.
Possible damages or risk exposure can be controlled in two ways: controlling the risk
itself or by controlling the impact of the risk. Changing the Efecte and Inspector
installers so that least required privileges are used would control the impact. Yet
the impact of attacks such as SQL injection and path traversal is quite bad even
without this additional exposure from the extra privileges so minimization of risk
was chosen as the mitigation method.
Were creation of less privileged services to become sufficiently easy, this situation
would get fixed, but for the time being, risk leverage of creating less privileged
services is too low.
6.7 Loose access control in actions
As described in Section 5.2, requests to Efecte’s JSP-based part are mapped to
actions that are either Java classes or JSP files. Access control of actions is divided to
two parts: configuration file governs whether or not an action requires authentication
to Efecte and actions themselves combined with normal Efecte access controls govern
what sort of permissions are required for an authenticated user.
There is actually only one action that does not require authentication and the con-
troller wisely defaults to requiring authentication when unauthenticated access is not
specifically allowed in configuration file. This defaulting to a choice that maintains
integrity and confidentiality possibly at the expense of availability is the principle
of fail-safe defaults, one of the eight principles discussed in Section 3.3.3.
Unfortunately, access to actions does not follow this principle. Instead, actions
default to allowing access to all users that the controller has allowed to access the
action meaning that if nothing else was specified in the action, only requirement was
that user was authenticated. Denying access to actions is based on the explicit check
of administrative permissions that developers need to add to each of the actions.
Other problem related to actions was that result pages assumed that control flew to
them from actions but result pages could be reached on their own. As assumptions
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form the basis of system’s security, broken assumptions mean that system cannot
be considered secure.
6.7.1 Evaluation
First problem originated from the lack of fail-safe defaults. Problem of not denying
access to legitimate users (easy to notice) was turned into a problem of allowing
access to illegitimate users (harder to notice). Ultimately, some actions required too
few administrative permissions. Such actions allowed an attacker to read or modify
information only an administrator was supposed to see, such as connected users or
hit rate of a database cache.
These lapses of access control enabled attacks ranging from quite harmless disclosure
of information to gaining of administrative privileges and thus complete loss of
confidentiality, integrity and availability. There is no reason to implement access
control in the described way of“opt-in” instead of following principle of fail-safe
defaults.
The problem of broken assumptions meant that all of the result pages could cause se-
curity problems. As always with broken assumptions, this led to variety of problems
covering confidentiality, integrity and availability.
Both problems were intensified by the fact that some actions and result pages act as
trusted procedures: after checking for supposedly correct preconditions, they change
user’s level to “root”, bypassing other security checks.
6.7.2 Solution: proper access control
A proper fix to the first problem is to implement access control of actions using
by using fail-safe defaults; each action would require user’s level to be root by
default and lesser requirements could be added explicitly. Then an action editing
users would require “edit users” administrative permission and if check for such
permission was omitted, only a root could use the action.
Unfortunately, such a change of design affects naturally all actions and then some ad-
ditional parts of Efecte. For this reason, such a change has not yet been implemented
and instead old vulnerable actions have been modified to check for permissions cor-
rectly. As all actions were reviewed by hand during vulnerability analysis, we are
assured that there are no flawed access checks in actions.
For the second problem, the problem of broken assumptions, there were two ways
to fix the situation: add access checks to place where the actual access is done, not
just to the start of an action (complete mediation) or make the assumption again
valid. Making assumptions valid would require moving the result page JSP files to
“WEB-INF”, a directory that Java application servers deny direct access to and
updating references to such JSP files. This is a solution that is easy to automate
whereas complete mediation solution would require more work and duplicate some
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of the checks both in the action and in the result page.
The problem was solved by moving the JSPs into “WEB-INF”. The solution has the
downside that were the assumption become invalid again, as has been case earlier
with Resin, the same vulnerabilities would follow.
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7 Conclusions
Ten years is a long time on software industry, especially in the field of web ap-
plications. During that ten years, web technologies have advanced immensely and
many applications that simply were impossible in 1999 are now used every day by
millions of users. Unfortunately, new technologies have bought new attacks with
them. Many of the attacks that were effective against Efecte were not even invented
when development of Efecte started. During those then years of Efecte development,
the development process at Efecte has changed from unstructured development to
structured Scrum-process with proper code reviews, testing and education. Effects
of this change were visible also in this work as many of the vulnerabilities found were
old and could not get to the code base nowadays. Until this thesis’ work, however,
security issues were not substantially brought up.
This thesis represented efforts of a security push at Efecte similar to what Mi-
crosoft went through in 2002 [HL03], except in smaller scale. Work on the thesis
started with self-education on the fundamentals of computer and information secu-
rity. Fundamentals were followed by small parts from the field of computer security
that seemed to make sense in the direction the thesis was going to although not all
the knowledge found direct application in the empirical part.
What found direct use in the empirical part was all the research into web tech-
nologies, as knowing the problem domain is the first requirement for any successful
analysis. Thus, different web technologies used to build web applications and com-
mon vulnerabilities in such applications were discussed and provided a good starting
point to later analyses.
In the empirical part of this thesis, application of the security assessment methods
suffered some reversals, partly for lack of proper tools, partly for lack of experience.
Lack of tools made editing attack tree models cumbersome and proper attack surface
analysis well nigh impossible. Still the result were, if not the best, at least good in
the sense that new vulnerable areas in Efecte were uncovered. Most of the earlier
work of Efecte security had been, rightly so, focused on common web application
vulnerabilities and this thesis’ work demonstrated that an application is not made
secure just by fixing the most common vulnerabilities.
In a way, the security push is still ongoing. The knowledge gained in this thesis’
theoretical and experimental part has yet to diffuse to other developers and not all
devised enhancements for security are implemented nor will they all ever be because
of the trade offs that need to made.
7.1 Future work
In this thesis, two possibly very useful methods, attack trees and attack surface
analysis could not be applied in full because lack of tools and knowledge. Should
there be another security push, revisiting those analysis methods and tools should
be a starting point.
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Two large stones that were left completely unturned were use of static analysis tools
and of other programming languages.
Static analysis tools, such as CodeSecure based on WebSSARI [HYH+04], analyze
the code of the application without actually running it, hoping to find signs of
vulnerabilities such as insecure flow of data or unchecked memory accesses. If such
tool could be integrated seamlessly into development environment, benefits would
be great. Warning of security errors as modern development environments warn
of syntax errors is one thing but more importantly, such tool could most certainly
analyze security issues in third party libraries used.
Different programming languages could offer at least two benefits: better specifica-
tion of levels of trust for the data and a possibility to separate security concerns
from other concerns, making parts of a program easier to understand and use.
Ultimately, none of these methods and tools will be a silver bullet for the slaying
beast of security problems. Still, sometimes even grazing it will be worthwhile.
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